Ali Garh
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Posts posted by Ali Garh
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Вот эти херовины у них от старших алтайских братьев.
Ещё есть подобные системы из Украины и Талмудии.
Короче, количествo реактивного оружия у них не хилоe.
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Я не могу понять почему дашнаки дободались до Нлбошника.
Типа царь хороший, это бояре плохие ?
Можно подумать мид Армении это его цех, а Серж там просто процент имеет.
А насчет протолоков анкарских мудрецов , так они лохотронище ещё
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The Obama administration has notified Congress of a possible $7.8 billion sale of Patriot PAC-3 antimissile batteries and related gear to Turkey, the only NATO ally bordering Iran.<br /><br /> The sale would include 13 Patriot "fire units," 72 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and a range of associated hardware for ground-based air defense, the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in a notice made public Friday.<br /><br /> It estimated the cost at $7.8 billion, which would be one of the biggest U.S. government-to-government arms sales in years and would mark a return of Turkey as a major U.S. arms buyer.<br /><br /> Turkey would use the PAC-3 guided missiles to boost its missile-defense capability, strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats, the defense agency said.<br /><br /> "Turkey is a partner of the United States in ensuring peace and stability in the region," it said. "It is vital to the U.S. national interest to assist our North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability that will contribute to an acceptable military balance in the area."<br /><br /> Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Iran's leaders on July 26 that if they were seeking nuclear weapons, "your pursuit is futile," days after she raised the possibility of a U.S.-built "defense umbrella" over the Middle East to counter Iranian clout.<br /><br /> In separate notices to Congress released Friday, the Obama administration announced a potential $220 million artillery rocket sale to Jordan and a possible $187 million sale of F-16 fighter-carried weapons to Morocco.<br /><br /> The primary contractors for the Turkish sale would be Raytheon Co and Lockheed Martin Corp. The notice of a potential sale is required by law. It does not mean a sale has been concluded.<br /><br /> In the case of a NATO member such as Turkey, Congress has 15 days to block a proposed arms deal by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, though it never has stopped a sale once formally notified.<br /><br /> The proposed supply of the equipment to Turkey, along with U.S. logistical support, would not alter the basic military balance in the region, the notice to Congress said.<br /><br /> This would mark the first Turkish purchase of PAC-3 missiles, it said. It would reverse a Turkish trend away from U.S. arms purchases in recent years, said Soner Cagaptay, an expert on Turkey at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a nonpartisan research group.<br /><br /> Such a purchase would represent "a big consolidation of U.S.-Turkish military ties," he said.<br /><br /> The Patriot PAC-3 missile would provide Turkey some capability to defend against short-range Iranian SCUD missiles with a range of 500 kms to more than 800 kms, said Steven Hildreth, a missile-defense expert at the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service.<br /><br /> Iranian missiles are currently capable of reaching all of Turkey, Hildreth said.<br /><br /> Turkey's geostrategic importance for the United States depends partly on Incirlik Air Base, located near Adana in southeast Turkey. KC-135 refueling planes operating out of Incirlik have delivered more than 35 million gallons of fuel to U.S. warplanes on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the research service said in a report last year.<br /><br /> Carol Migdalovitz, an expert on the country at the research service, said the proposed sale showed Turkey was hedging its bets on improved ties with Iran.<br /><br /> "While it has improved (bilateral) trade and energy ties, Turkey remains wary of Iran's nuclear program," she said.<br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://" target="_blank">
<http://www.asbarez.com/2009/09/11/u-s-eyes-7-8-billion-missile-sale-to-turkey/>
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Когда в Армении поханил Кривоглазый из страны свалило больше миллиона чел.
Этим армянам на сегодняшний день не надо учить язык, аклиматизироваться к хаястанским дрвацкам, у многих осталось недвижомость.
Для них главная проблема это нахождения источника дохода в Армении.
По сравнению с теми из нас кто отари джура хмац, для хаястанских вписаться в жизнь Армении это как 2 пальца изолентой обматать.
Поэтому прежде чем фаловать на Родину сухумских или краснодарских армян, для начала надо устаканить ситуацию с теми кто уехал из Армении в последние 20 лет.
И вопросом репатриации, так сказать, не кошерных армян должны заниматься предпочтительно не дауны.
Смотрю я передачу из Талмудии. В студию русской ТВ станции (причем она там не единственная) пришел депутат Кнессета и отвечает на вопросы журналиста.
Журналист с ним по русски, а депутат отвечает ему на иврите. Последнему естественно делают синхронный перевод.
Вы можете себе представить что-либо подобное у нас ?
Ара, лезвов хоса !!!
А этого "лезвабана" если потом хорошенько расчесать, то найдете курда.
Вот такая вот веселуха
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US Jews push Obama to act on Iran
Several hundred Jewish leaders and activists are planning to arrive here Thursday to urge top Obama administration officials and US congressmen to take action on Iran.
They are pushing for Congress to quickly pass an Iran sanctions bill sponsored by US House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman and otherwise take serious economic and diplomatic steps to pressure Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear capabilities that threaten Israel.
"Congress is back, legislation is on the agenda, and this is September, when at some level decisions are being made in connection with Iran," Anti-Defamation League Washington Director Jess Hordes said of the planning of the event.
His organization will be joining the United Jewish Communities, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the National Conference of Soviet Jewry and several other groups as part of the effort.
"A government that has so little regard for human life, truth and human rights as does the current Iranian regime must not be entrusted to possess the most powerful weapons known to humankind," the event organizers said, in a statement announcing the advocacy day.
So far, the group is scheduled to hear from Berman, House Minority Leader John Boehner and House Minority Whip Eric Cantor at an open forum and then meet with an administration official before breaking up into groups to lobby individual legislators on Capitol Hill.
Berman's Iran legislation would sanction companies providing Iran with refined petroleum as well as insurance for such trade and other related measures. The legislation was originally introduced in May, along with a similar Senate bill, but Berman has held off on advancing it to give the diplomatic process time to work.
However, Berman indicated this summer that he would be looking to take action on the legislation pending the late September deadline that the Obama administration gave Iran to respond to its diplomatic overtures. At the same time, the Senate is looking to hold hearings and otherwise build momentum for its legislation.
It's not clear at this point how the Obama administration feels about the sanctions bills, though it has threatened "crippling sanctions" against Iran should diplomatic engagement fail.
The White House would not comment on whether or not it supported the proposed legislation.
Though the sponsors of Thursday's advocacy day have a wide coalition of groups working with them, some Jewish activists have taken issue with the approach.
"We urge rejecting deadlines imposed by outside parties, or deadlines that are the product of anything other than assessments by the Obama administration of the state-of-play of current diplomatic efforts," said Americans for Peace Now President Debra DeLee in a statement.
"We also believe that additional sanctions aimed squarely at the ruling regime and its members may make sense, but that the US must not make the mistake of pursuing sanctions that target the Iranian people - like the 'crippling' sanctions currently under consideration."
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Участники Генеральной ассамблеи ООН проголосовали в среду, 9 сентября, за принятие проекта резолюции, предусматривающей возвращение беженцев в Абхазию и Южную Осетию. Об этом сообщает ИТАР-ТАСС .
За документ, предложенный Грузией, проголосовали 48 делегаций, 19 высказались против, остальные 78 воздержались.
Как напоминает «Наша Абхазия», в резолюции предложено разработать график возвращения в свои дома «всех внутренне перемещенных лиц и беженцев, пострадавших в результате конфликтов в Грузии», в том числе, в Абхазию и Южную Осетию. В ней подчеркивается, что документ касается всех беженцев, независимо от их этнической принадлежности.
Проект резолюции вызвал негативную реакцию со стороны России. Перед началом голосования постпред РФ в ООН Виталий Чуркин назвал документ «политизированным и конфронтационным» и потребовал снять его с повестки дня.
По его словам, российская делегация стала единственной, кому проект резолюции представлен не был. Кроме того, грузинская сторона, отметил он, отказалась от совместного обсуждения текста резолюции с целью достижения консенсуса.
Предложенная резолюция «никак не будет содействовать укреплению доверия между грузинской, абхазской и югоосетинской сторонами, что является непременным условием решения, в том числе, проблем беженцев и временно перемещенных лиц», — подчеркнул российский постпред.
Президент Грузии Михаил Саакашвили , в свою очередь, выразил удовлетворение в связи с принятием резолюции, сообщает «Интерфакс» . В своем выступлении, которое транслировалось вечером по грузинским телеканалам, он особо отметил, что документ осуждает «этническую чистку и осуществленную Россией агрессию».
По данным «Нашей Абхазии», в настоящее время в Грузии насчитывается более 290 тысяч внутренне перемещенных лиц, 83,7 процента из которых оказались в таком положении из-за грузино-абхазского конфликта.
Предыдущая резолюция, предложенная Грузией и посвященная проблеме беженцев, была принята Генассамблеей ООН в мае 2008 года. В ней речь шла только о тех лицах, которые были вынуждены покинуть Абхазию. Тогда в ее поддержку выступили 14 стран, 11 проголосовали против, 105 делегаций воздержались.
Россия тогда также раскритиковала документ, указав, что он не учитывает интересы абхазцев и осетин.
Резолюции, принятые Генеральной ассамблеей ООН, не являются обязательными для исполнения и носят только рекомендательный характер.
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Любите Роба или нет, но по крайней мере у него хватило чувства само-уважения в конце концов послать турков на xoй вместе с их бесконечными "дипломатическими констультациями".
И этому кебабчи Эрдогану он руки не подавал.
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Так я же грю, Ленин в Польше ©
...to primarily ensure “the security of the transport infrastructure” in the area. -
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Azerbaijan has said it may consider opening its borders with Armenia if Yerevan agrees to making major concessions to Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, an Azerbaijani official was quoted by the Turkish Today's Zaman as saying on Tuesday.
Azeri Foreign Ministry Spokesman Elkhan Polukhov told Today's Zaman that Azerbaijan may consider opening its borders with Armenia if "a breakthrough" is reached in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Polukhov described that breakthrough as an agreement by Yerevan to return to Azeri control five of the seven liberated Armenian districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh with no conditions. He also added that an agreement is necessary for the return of the strategic regions of Kelbajar and Lachin, connecting the two Armenian republics.
He, however, said it is too early to discuss the mandate and structure of peacekeeping forces that would be required in the territories if they are to be returned to Azeri control.
"It has been said in earlier statements from Azerbaijani officials that Azerbaijan is ready to open borders and restore dialogue with Armenia if the first stage of a plan to resolve the conflict is implemented," he said.
The Madrid principles governing the Karabakh peace process call for a withdrawal of the liberated territories and their return to Azerbaijan, the return of Azeri refugees to Karabakh, and envision a future referendum of self-determination in Karabakh.
According to Polukhov, Azerbaijan will populate the liberated regions with nearly half a million Azeris kept in refugee camps by the state since the outbreak of the Karabakh war.
The remarks follow weeks of political maneuvering by Baku to hinge the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia to a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict favoring Azerbaijan.
When these conditions are met, he added, "both railways and highways between the two countries will be operational."
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Israel to Turkey FM: If you want to visit Gaza, don't come here
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's planned visit to Israel has been left in doubt after Jerusalem warned that he would not be allowed to enter the Gaza Strip from Israeli territory.
Davutoglu had been invited to take part in the Presidents' Conference, which is scheduled to take place in a few weeks in Jerusalem.
However, the recent warning and the tense relations between Israel and Turkey since Operation Cast Lead make it now unclear whether Davutoglu will make the trip.
Israeli officials' principal fear in regard to the visit is that if Davutoglu goes to Gaza, it will become a festive event for Hamas and it will become a media circus with the Turkish FM staying amidst the rubble of buildings destroyed by the IDF during Cast Lead. Officials suspect Davutoglu would also be encouraged to make anti-Israel statements.
Israel-Turkey relations have been tense since Cast Lead, especially in light of a televised fracasbetween President Shimon Peres and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the Davos Conference this past January.
Turkey adopted a critical stance on Israel and Erdogan maintained that Israel was carrying out genocide in the Gaza Strip. Since then, the two states have maintained diplomatic and military contacts but have not had any meetings between high-level officials.
Davutoglu was appointed foreign minister only recently, and has sought a role in future peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
A senior Israeli official said that over a month ago the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry contacted his Israeli counterpart Yossi Gal, and offered to arrange a visit by the Turkish foreign minister to Israel.
The Turkish official asked Gal about the possibility of a visit to Gaza and Gal told him that he would be welcomed warmly in Israel but that a visit to the Gaza Strip would "not be helpful".
A few weeks later, Turkish offices again tried to bring up the issue of a visit to Gaza and Turkey's Ambassador to Israel Namik Tan met with Gal and told him that Davutoglu received an invite to the Presidents' Conference in October and was weighing whether to attend. The Turkish ambassador asked if a trip to Gaza during that time would be possible.
The decision was later made in the Foreign Ministry that if the Turkish foreign minister's trip to Israel were to include a visit to the Gaza Strip, the request would have to be refused.
A top Israel official said "Turkish leadership during Operation Cast Lead did not encourage us to agree to this request."
Gal told the Turkish ambassador that "there are other places in the world from where it's possible to enter the Gaza Strip."
In the statement, Gal was implying that Egypt would be a possible point of entry to the Strip, but Israeli sources have said the Egyptian would not be inclined to allow the Turkish foreign minister to enter Gaza from their territory
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Я представляю какой шок переходящий в истерику испытает Zəhərbaijan если хаи откроют в Дагестане военную базу
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Armenia will not have a permanent military presence in Russia as part of its involvement in a Russian-led rapid reaction force comprising troops from five former Soviet republics, a top official in Moscow said on Thursday.
An agreement on the formation of the force, officially called the Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF), was formalized in June during a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led military alliance. Two of the CSTO’s seven member states, Belarus and Uzbekistan, refused to sign the agreement because of major disagreements with Moscow.
Citing an unnamed official at the CSTO headquarters in Moscow, the Russian Regnum news agency reported last month that under the terms of the deal, Armenia will be able to open two military bases in the Russian North Caucasus. The official was quoted as saying that the “limited contingent” would be stationed in the Krasnodar region and the restive Muslim republic of Dagestan to primarily ensure “the security of the transport infrastructure” in the area.
The Armenian government has not explicitly denied the information so far. But Nikolay Bordyuzha, the CSTO secretary general, insisted on Thursday that Moscow and Yerevan have not even negotiated on the possibility of Armenian troop deployment in the mentioned area.
“Armenia is a party to the agreement on the Collective Operational Reaction Forces and has set aside army units and special forces from national security and internal affairs bodies for that purpose,” Bordyuzha told Armenian journalists in a video conference from Moscow.
Bordyuzha said those forces would be normally based in Armenia. The CORF would use them only “in cases where there is a need for their involvement in carrying out a concrete military task,” he added.
The Russian military is expected to contribute by far the largest contingent of the CORF. Official Yerevan has yet to specify the number of Armenian soldiers and other security personnel that it will commit to the NATO-style force.
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Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy of the National Assembly, and founder of Heritage Party Raffi Hovannisian has vacated his Parliament seat as of September 7 as a sign of disagreement with the recent developments in the foreign policy of Armenia.
The opposition leader and would-be presidential candidate has not officially resigned, but his party confirms the decision.
“The news about giving up the mandate is true. And it is his own decision,” Stepan Safaryan, secretary of Heritage Faction told ArmeniaNow.
According to Safaryan, the main motivations of such a decision “are the recent developments in the foreign policy of Armenia, and it is more important to express one’s own position concerning them than the mandate itself,” Safaryan adds.
Analyst Richard Giragosian, head of the Yerevan-based Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS) founded by Hovannisian, during an interview with ArmeniaNow evaluated the step made by the MP as a “symbolically significant event.”
According to Giragosian, this is a protest against Armenian-Turkish diplomacy.
“This is a protest over the course of Armenian-Turkish diplomacy, which sends a strong message to the Armenian government and opposition that issues of national importance, such as Armenia's talks with Turkey, are more important than individuals or personalities,” Giragosian says.
“His move is also a reminder that the future of Armenia depends on the decisions taken today. And the current issue of Armenian-Turkish relations should not, and must not be addressed by late-night statement reached in secret, but rather, must be debated and decided by the entire Armenian nation. In this way, his decision sends a clear and present message to the world, the Diaspora and to the Armenian authorities that Armenia's future is now at stake,” Giragosian adds.
Suren Surenyants, an Armenian National Congress (ANC) supporter, believes that “the giving up of the mandate will have no influence upon those processes.”
Heritage member Movses Aristakesyan will take over Hovannisian’s role as MP.
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U.S., Iraq cracking down on anti-Iran Kurdish guerrillas
QANDIL MOUNTAINS, Iraq — A noose is tightening around the group that calls itself the last armed resistance to Iran's Islamic republic, but the Kalashnikov-carrying guerrillas are refusing to lay down their weapons and leave their camouflaged outposts in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.
Washington has frozen the assets of the Kurdistan Free Life Party, or PJAK, an anti-Iranian militia that at one point had an informal intelligence-sharing relationship with the American military, and Iraq has shut down its political activities. Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government also is pushing the group to disarm.
Iran is cooperating with Iraq and Turkey in curbing the group, but continues to launch missile strikes at PJAK-controlled territory inside Iraq. One assault struck inside Iraq on Aug. 23, an Iraqi Kurdish military commander said.
PJAK is "killing people in Iran and hiding in our country," said Sami al Askari, a close adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. "The government wishes to disarm this group by peaceful efforts, but if we are obliged to use force, we will use it."
PJAK's isolation is beginning to resemble that of the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq, another anti-Iranian group that shared intelligence with the U.S. and had a refuge in Iraq until this year, when the Iraqi government moved to take down its camps. Unlike the MEK, however, PJAK intends to stick to its guns.
Interviewed in their camps in the Qandil Mountains, a historic retreat for Kurdish independence movements since the 1960s, PJAK leaders are defiant.
"Sometimes we've been asked to disarm, but we don't take those requests into consideration," said Agir Shaho, 31, a PJAK commander and member of the organization's seven-person board of coordinators, flanked by armed guards. "If we do what they're asking, we won't have freedom."
The group says it's killed hundreds of Iranian police and soldiers since 2004 in raids on their outposts. Inside Iraq, Shaho and several hundred PJAK fighters find cover in stone houses topped with plastic tarps and disguised with dead tree branches. They move across the border on foot, and grow their own food in irrigated gardens.
PJAK is an offshoot of the larger and better-funded Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which has fought in Turkey — often finding sanctuary in northern Iraq — since the 1980s in clashes that have killed tens of thousands of people. They share the objective of establishing Kurdish autonomy in a region that covers parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.
The PKK focuses on Turkey and PJAK on Iran. Short of independence, the militias want recognition, minority rights and more self-government for Kurds.
PJAK's redoubt is about 150 miles northwest of the northern Iraqi city of Irbil. To reach it, a visitor must drive past three Kurdish government checkpoints and one controlled by PJAK's sister party, the PKK. Young militia members inspect identification cards and report visitors by radio to officers deeper in the mountains. Well-paved roads maintained by the PKK give way to riveted dirt trails that lead to PJAK's bases, several hours by car from the last PKK checkpoint.
Snow blankets their terrain in winter months. In the summer, tall golden grass covers the peaks. Dirt roads skirt about 10 villages where satellite dishes poke out from ramshackle roofs.
A giant portrait of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, imprisoned in Turkey, covers a hillside. PKK members, half of them women, till farmland along the way to the Iranian border.
The two militias wear similar uniforms — green jackets with matching loose-fitting pants, tied with a sash at the waist. They've also created a lush rose garden and cemetery in the mountains where they honor dozens of their "martyrs" — men and women who were killed in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey.
PJAK and the PKK have been largely quiet this summer, a change from the past few years when PJAK attacks in Iran and PKK assaults in Turkey led Ankara, Tehran and Baghdad to collaborate on border threats. PJAK members say their territory has been bombed by Turkish jets and shelled by Iranian artillery. The two countries have cooperated against the PKK and PJAK since late 2006.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran will confront strongly any terrorist phenomena," said Hassan Kazimi Qummi, the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad, in a written response to questions from McClatchy. "There is cooperation between (Iraq and Iran) and the region concerning efforts to secure the borders."
Tehran occasionally blames the U.S. for funding PJAK, as it did in state media reports about strikes against PJAK outposts in Iran in late August. Qummi wouldn't make that link, except in an indirect suggestion that the U.S. had supported PJAK in the past, when McClatchy asked him about the group.
Former PJAK and former U.S. officials said the U.S. had hoped to develop a relationship with the militia, but the guerrilla assaults by the PKK in Turkey provoked a crisis in U.S.-Turkish relations, and the Bush administration opted to back its ally Turkey.
The U.S. sent low-level military delegations to meet with PJAK early in the Iraq war, around 2004, to gather intelligence about Iran, said Osman Ocalan, a PJAK founder and brother of PKK leader Abudllah Ocalan who defected from both groups.
A former top U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the contacts remain classified, confirmed Ocalan's assertions.
Ocalan said the U.S. and PJAK discreetly exchanged information for a time, but he characterized the relationship as "weak." Another current senior leader in the PKK, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to protect his safety, said that Washington continues to have a liaison with PJAK. He refused to elaborate.
"America wanted to get involved with PJAK to annoy Iran, and use PJAK as a winning card in the conflict between Iran and America," said Osman Ocalan, who now lives in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya. "PJAK has activities inside Iran, and also they have followers, and that was very seductive for the American side."
Shaho, the guerrilla commander, and Ocalan, the defector, each said that the Obama administration's February move to freeze PJAK's assets and condemn its attacks would have little direct impact on the group.
PJAK's leader, Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi, lives in Germany, and the organization's assets are thought to be in Europe or gathered from Kurds living in Iran.
PJAK "absolutely does not put its money in the American banks, and that decision and announcement is not real," Ocalan said.
Shaho denied that the American government ever assisted PJAK in any way.
"If we really had support from America, we could do much more. If we had help, we wouldn't stay here," said Shaho, sitting in a hardscrabble village a few miles from the Iranian border.
The PKK and PJAK could become more aggressive this month. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is expected to issue new orders for his organization within weeks, which could include lifting what has been a de facto cease-fire while peace talks progressed between the PKK, Ankara and Baghdad, said Roj Welat, a spokesman for an umbrella organization to which PJAK and the PKK belong.
Shaho said his organization had scaled back its offensive operations to give space for Iran's June elections and July votes for Iraq's Kurdish Regional Government.
The lull, however, shows signs of snapping before the militias plan to resume their offensive. Iran on Aug. 23 announced that it had killed 26 PJAK members in northwest Iran. It fired a missile strike inside PJAK turf in Iraq in late July, as well.
Iraqi Kurdish leaders have constricted PJAK's political activity, but are unlikely to use military force to dislodge the group because many Kurds are at least sympathetic to PJAK's cause. Still, the Iraqi Kurdish government blames PJAK for Iran's cross-border attacks, not Tehran.
"We do not want to be caught in the middle of these fires," said Falah Mustafa Bakir, the foreign minister for the Kurdish Regional Government, which has banned PJAK the PKK from opening political offices in its provinces. "So long as we have these armed groups, we won't have a peaceful and secure future."
Shaho, the guerilla leader, views the coordination against his group as Baghdad's Arab-led government bowing to Iran. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and many leaders from his Dawa Party sought exile in Iran for years before Saddam Hussein's fall.
"Everyone knows that the Iranian and Iraqi governments are connected," said Shaho. "Those who like Maliki should like Iran, because their governments are tied."
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@SamvelT
Сеньку за велком.
Недалеко от того места где Варя толкала "Эстэ Морис" и лезвия Руби
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А вот этот, прости господи, гагулик с фэйсом северо-африканского семита был сфоткан на московском пищевом экспо.
Приехали, понимаешь, на арбе из Алтая - а сегодня стали нехилыми по обьему продаж экспортерами оливок и их вариаций.
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Олбанский танк в Карабахе после фатальной попытки бизимдиризации
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Last month, Turkish President Abdullah Gul broke a long-standing national taboo: He called the remote village of Guroymak by its Kurdish name, Norshin.
The president's opponents say renaming Istanbul Constantinople on highway signs will inevitably follow. Or worse. For many Turks, saying Norshin leads to saying Kurdistan, and saying Kurdistan leads to recognizing an independent Kurdish state stretching across Iran, Iraq, and southeastern Turkey.
After a 1980 military coup, Turkey "Turkified": It banned the Kurdish language, imposed new Turkish place names, and famously declared that Kurds were actually "mountain Turks." Its government has since abandoned this extreme form of forced assimilation. But allowing or using Kurdish names is still a politically charged act, seen by many Turks as a concession to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (better known as the PKK), which has fought a brutal 25-year battle for Kurdish independence.
The Turkish government wants to end the PKK's terrorist campaign without splitting off a Kurdish state -- and sees extending cultural rights and linguistic freedoms as the way to do it. But what will it take to reconcile the Turks and the Kurds?
The verbal recognition of Kurds and Kurdish culture at the highest political level is a first step, as Gul's use of the name Norshin demonstrates. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently brought a number of parliamentarians to tears by saying that something is terribly wrong when the mothers of Turkish soldiers and the mothers of PKK fighters are saying the same prayers over their sons' bodies. That such a comparison can even be made is itself a sign of progress.
And there are concrete changes, too. Already, the government has opened a Kurdish radio station and promoted Kurdish literature classes at universities. In late July, Erdogan announced his government was beginning a "Kurdish Initiative." He has not yet provided any details. But most Turkish journalists expect the government to allow public servants and politicians to speak Kurdish, end restrictions on Kurdish media, give some form of amnesty to all but the highest ranking PKK members, and possibly even revise the Constitution to allow Kurds to be full Turkish citizens without giving up their Kurdish identity. (Those Kurds who are proud to call themselves Turks have always been accepted and often risen high in the ranks of politics and pop culture)
These initiatives have met -- and will meet -- tremendous push-back. Previous leaders have considered similar changes, such as calling citizens "Turkiyeli" (from Turkey) rather than "Turkish," to emphasize citizenship over ethnic identity. But obstacles to implementing such initiatives have been insurmountable. Already, the two leading opposition parties have denounced Erdogan's plan. Plus, Turkey has a Constitutional Court with the power to strike down laws that alter the country's "unamendable" constitutional articles -- one of which declares that the national language is Turkish.
This time around, though, the government has the army, a long-time rival, on its side. Realizing at last that the fight will never be won through purely military means, Turkey's leading general now supports greater cultural freedom for Kurds and wants to make it easier for PKK members to surrender. The National Security Council, traditionally a vehicle for the military to "advise" the government on political issues, also gave its blessing to the initiative.
Still, security and foreign-policy concerns complicate the issue. Numerous Turks are convinced that the U.S. government -- a friend to politicians and generals, a foe to most everyone else -- is behind the Kurdish initiative. They presume that the United States is desperate to ensure stability in northern Iraq as it prepares to withdraw from the country. Thus, they claim, the United States, after supporting the PKK for years, is now forcing Turkey to give in to PKK demands in order to foster peace with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
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Ниже адвокат разложил все по полочкам. Очередной алтайский лохотрон предполагающий капитальные уступки со стороны армян в замен на обещание когда-нибудь в будущем дистанционно исполнить для армянской аудитории стариную турецкую мелодию.
А может и не исполнить.
The other day, a friendly Congressman’s staffer, upon his review of the twin Protocols aimed at normalizing bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey, conveyed the following observation to the Armenian National Committee of America’s Washington office:
“What Armenia is giving up is tangible and in the present as opposed to what Turkey is giving up that may or not come in the future.”
This observation is a fittingly accurate description of the essence and purpose of the proposed dual Protocols, which will be examined over the next six weeks in Armenia and Turkey and then ratified by the legislative bodies of each country. It should be hoped that the Armenian people and their homeland government will be able to comprehend the full portents of the Congressional staffer’s observation – as it clearly hints that the so-called Protocols are grounded on perilous paths and unrealistic roadways that can only push the Armenian side into harm’s way.
It is not that difficult to pin down the dangers posed by these Protocols. Let us start from the very beginning.
In the context of the current bilateral normalization process, Armenia’s sole and immediate objective is the opening of borders by Turkey. The achievement of this objective was imposed upon Armenia especially in the aftermath of last year’s war between Russia and Georgia, when Georgia’s internal instability created sequential obstacles for the normal transportation of over 70% of Armenia’s imports and exports.
For Turkey, the opening of borders with Armenia rests on three objectives. First, to finalize and legalize Armenia’s currently held frontiers with Turkey that have been left legally undetermined since 1920. Second, to halt the international affirmation of the Armenian Genocide and its ensuing territorial and financial restitution. Third, to dismantle the independent Republic of Nagorno Karabakh and subject its territory to Azerbaijan’s jusrisdiction.
Armenia’s lone objective, which requires immediate implementation, is based purely on economic considerations. The border is already half open, because Armenia has not closed down its side of the territory. Turkey, which keeps its side of the territory closed since 1993, is obligated under international law, as well as on the principle of good neighborly relations, to open its borders immediately.
The triple Turkish objectives, which cannot be subject to immediate implementation, are based purely on territorial considerations. And resolution of territorial disputes, as experience suggests in diplomatic affairs, require lengthy processes of difficult negotiations.
The proposed Protocols, in substance as well as in form, convolute the timing of each party’s objectives by turning them upside down. Their pertinent provisions entitle the first and second Turkish objectives – legalization of the current frontier regime, and cessation of Armenian Genocide recognition and claims – with the status of immediate implementation. (As for the third Turkish objective pertaining Nagorno Karabakh, the Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, within hours of the execution of the Protocols, turned it into a corollary of these documents, when he announced that in the context of the normalization process with Armenia Turkey will defend Azerbaijan’s interests regarding Nagorno Karabakh.)
On the other hand, the very same provisions of the Protocols render a status of dependency to Armenia’s economic objective for the border opening, which in fact has to be entitled to immediate implementation. Furthermore, this status of dependency turned into a remotely implementable and even an unenforceable proposition by Mr. Davutoglu, when he indicated in his above statement that opening the border was out of the question for now, because “a longer process is required for that.”
If the proposed Protocols are ratified in their existing contents, Armenia will obtain nothing in return in order to suffice its sole demand for the opening of the borders by Turkey – except perhaps an ephemeral promise or an unsubstantiated hope that someday somehow the borders may open.
As for Turkey, it will be able to achieve all of its demands, thereby fulfilling its dream of legalizing the usurpation of a large portion of Armenian homeland since 1920.
For Turkey, the twin Protocols are firmly anchored on beneficial and realistic grounds. For Armenia, those grounds lead only onto perilous paths, over unrealistic roadways, and into harm’s way.
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Как стало известно "Ъ", на долю российского НПО "Сатурн" в компании PowerJet, СП с французской Snecma по выпуску двигателей для самолета SSJ 100, наложен арест. Обеспечительная мера принята по иску офшора Unimpex, с которым "Сатурн" в середине 1990-х годов не смог рассчитаться за самолет Ил-62 и 13 двигателей к нему. После выхода PowerJet на серийное производство тяжба может создать для компании существенные проблемы.
О том, что принадлежащий НПО "Сатурн" пакет акций PowerJet находится под арестом, "Ъ" рассказал источник, близкий к компании Unimpex. Как свидетельствуют материалы арбитражного суда при Хозяйственной палате Чехии и суда высшей инстанции Парижа (копии есть у "Ъ"), в феврале 1996 года зарегистрированная на Британских Виргинских островах Unimpex Enterprises Ltd заключила с компанией "Рыбинские моторы" (на ее основе в 2001 было создано НПО "Сатурн") контракт. По нему Unimpex продала российской компании самолет Ил-62 и 13 двигателей Д-30-КУ общей стоимостью $2,03 млн. В обмен "Рыбинские моторы" обязались отремонтировать для компании семь двигателей разных типов, но смогли отремонтировать только пять.
Невыполненные обязательства "Рыбинские моторы" предложили оплатить 45 230 собственных акций (около 6% от уставного капитала), но, как говорится в материалах суда, этого не произошло. После этого в 1998 году Unimpex обратилась в арбитражный суд при Хозяйственной палате Чехии с иском о взыскании с "Рыбинских моторов" ущерба, который был оценен в $1,04 млн. В мае 1999 года чешский суд принял решение в пользу истца, который пытался подтвердить его в российском суде, а когда это не удалось, в марте 2008 года предъявил к исполнению в суд высшей инстанции Парижа. Последний в качестве обеспечительной меры и наложил арест в июле 2008 года на все движимое имущество "Сатурна" во Франции, то есть на пакет акций PowerJet.
НПО "Сатурн" — разработчик и производитель двигателей, выручка по итогам 2008 года составила 9,14 млрд руб., чистый убыток — 428 млн руб. До конца прошлого года контролирующим акционером компании (около 60% акций) был ее гендиректор Юрий Ласточкин, в конце прошлого года из-за финансовых проблем он был вынужден продать свою долю холдингу "Оборонпром", входящему в "Ростехнологии".
PowerJet — совместное предприятие, созданное НПО "Сатурн" и французской Snecma для разработки двигателя SaM-146, который будет устанавливаться на самолет Sukhoi Superjet (SSJ) 100. "Сатурн" и Snecma владеют по 49,84% акций СП.
Представитель ОПК "Оборонпром" подтвердил факт ареста акций, добавив, что корпорация "следит за развитием ситуации", а судебный процесс еще не закончен. Источник, близкий к "Оборонпрому", пояснил, что арест запрещает "Сатурну" распоряжаться этим пакетом — продавать его, отдавать в залог и так далее, но продукция компании ни под какие ограничения не подпадает, так как на 50% принадлежит Snecma. Вместе с тем, признает собеседник "Ъ", ситуация изменится, когда СП выйдет на серийное производство и начнет получать заказы — платежи от заказчиков, поступающих на счета PowerJet, могут блокироваться и списываться в счет погашения требований истца, и это будет препятствовать нормальной хозяйственной деятельности СП. Источник "Ъ" добавляет, что владелец Unimpex — бывший миноритарный акционер и член совета директоров "Сатурна" Евгений Ливный и у руководства компании есть "большой вопрос, не был ли данный договор притворным".
Скорее всего, на работе PowerJet арест действительно не отразится, подтверждает партнер Baker & Mckenzie Владимир Хвалей: обеспечительные меры распространяются только на собственность "Сатурна", а PowerJet — отдельное юридическое лицо. Но история с Unimpex может нанести и "Сатурну" и России в целом огромный имиджевый ущерб, как это было в истории с фирмой Noga, особенно если учесть, что речь идет о главном проекте российского авиапрома — SSJ 100, констатирует гендиректор агентства Infomost Борис Рыбак.
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2 сентября президент Абхазии Сергей Багапш отдал приказ военно-морским силам страны уничтожать грузинские корабли в случае их обнаружения в территориальных водах Абхазии. Такие меры Багапш объяснил пиратскими действиями грузинских кораблей. Грузия заявила, что решение Абхазии продиктовано Москвой.
"Я отдал приказ нашим военно-морским силам уничтожать грузинские корабли, нарушающие морскую границу Абхазии. Этот шаг продиктован непрекращающимися пиратскими действиями со стороны Грузии. Хочу подчеркнуть, что речь идет о действиях исключительно ВМФ Абхазии. Никакие военно-морские силы России для решения данного вопроса не привлекаются и привлекаться не будут", — заявил Сергей Багапш. "К сожалению, сегодня можно говорить о грузинских пиратах наравне с пиратами сомалийскими. А подобные действия должны повлечь за собой адекватный ответ", — отметил в интервью агентству "Интерфакс" Багапш.
Начальник погранотряда службы госбезопасности Абхазии Зураб Маргания заявил, что флот страны "доминировал на море еще во время грузино-абхазской войны 1991-1992 годов", а с тех пор его возможности значительно возросли.
Грузия поспешила назвать заявление Багапша происками Кремля. "Все эти заявления со стороны незаконного режима в Абхазии продиктованы из Москвы. После оккупации Абхазии на суше Россия хочет установить контроль над грузинской морской акваторией", — сказал заместитель председателя парламента Грузии Паата Давитая. "Совершенно очевидно, кто является пиратом, и кто желает заниматься пиратством в территориальных водах чужого государства. Грузинская сторона вместе с международным сообществом в ответ на эти угрозы должна проводить жесткие меры по защите государственности Грузии", — заявил Давитая.
Грузинские эксперты, по данным "Интерфакса", увидели в новом повороте конфликта с Абхазией желание Москвы контролировать Черное море. "Россия желает взять контроль над морской границей Грузии, так как остается не так уж и много времени, когда российскому Черноморскому флоту придется оставить базу в Севастополе, поэтому уже сейчас предпринимаются шаги по базированию этого флота в Абхазии в порту Очамчире", — заявил политолог Сосо Цинцадзе. Грузинский эксперт по вопросам Кавказа Мамука Арешидзе скептически оценил потенциал ВМФ Абхазии. "Совершенно очевидно, что абхазские плавсредства не представляют никакой угрозы для грузинских пограничных судов, но можно предположить, что малые российские военные корабли под флагом Абхазии будут готовы спровоцировать вооруженное столкновение", — отметил Арешидзе.
С начала года береговая охрана Грузии задержала в акватории Абхазии 23 судна, в том числе 4 — "за нарушение правил входа в воды оккупированных территорий". Однако наибольшее внимание общественности вызвало беспрецедентно жесткое решение суда суд абхазского города Гагра, находящийся в изгнании в грузинском городе Кутаиси. 1 сентября он приговорил капитана турецкого судна Buket гражданина Турции Мехмета Остурка к 24 годам лишения свободы за "многократное нарушение государственной границы Грузии и нарушения правил мореходства на оккупированной территории". Капитану вменяется в вину попытка контрабанды 2 тыс. тонн бензина и 700 тонн дизельного топлива.
Власти Абхазии, обратившиеся после задержания судна Buket в ООН с требованием отреагировать на захват судов в Черном море, сразу же заявили, что готовы защитить идущие к ним корабли силами собственного флота. На прошлой неделе инициативу Сухуми поддержали в Москве: заместитель главы пограничной службы ФСБ России Евгений Инчин заявил, что береговая охрана ФСБ РФ совместно с абхазскими пограничниками обеспечит безопасность судов, заходящих в территориальные воды Абхазии, что предусмотрено соглашением РФ и Абхазии об охране границы. После этого заявления Сухуми пообещал захватывать направляющиеся в Грузию суда. "Грузинские суда идут мимо нас на Украину, в Болгарию и другие страны Черноморского бассейна, мы вынуждены будем предпринимать в отношении них те же меры,— сообщил "Ъ" глава абхазского МИДа Сергей Шамба.— Грузинские пограничники задерживают наши суда в нейтральных водах, мы будем делать то же самое. Мы не хотели такого поворота событий, но, поскольку мировое сообщество не может воздействовать на Грузию и, по сути, поощряет пиратство, мы вынуждены принимать адекватные меры. Очевидно, грузинские власти не извлекли для себя уроков из предыдущих провокаций и напрашиваются на новую трагедию".
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A decade under Putin makes Russia strategic partner for Turkey
Vladimir Putin's leadership in Russia over the last decade has marked unprecedented improvement in Turkish-Russian relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted not in competition between the two countries, but instead ever-growing cooperation.
Russia and Turkey, possessing similar historical statehood experiences and striving to redefine their role in a broader region has not yet, surprisingly, resulted in competition. Turkey's considerable dependence on Russia has encouraged Turkey not to confront the country and made it consider Russia's national interests in the formulation of its foreign policy. Being a driving force of the Soviet Union, Russia had considered Turkey a threat throughout the Cold War. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia did not enjoy very good relations until Putin. Both countries had fallen into deep economic recession and domestic obstacles hindered the development of constructive and cooperative foreign policy between two countries.
Turkey's attempt to create a sphere-of-influence in Turkic countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia contradicted Russia's national interests. Although Russia's relationship with NATO was not as confrontational at the time as it was after Putin took power, Russia and Turkey were still unable to build good relations. Geopolitical competition, however, did not halt their developing economic cooperation. Turkey's increasing trade with Russia marked one of the few cases in the world of cooperation between two regional leaders. Russia, in fact, considered the introduction of Western values a threat to its economic and political interests in its neighborhood. As a result, Russia took advantage of any available method to strengthen its economy. Turkey became a promising partner for Russia.
Before Putin's rise to power in 1999, succeeding pro-Western Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the man who put an end to the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia did not exchange many significant top-level visits. A notable exception was then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Turkey in 1997. Following this visit, a series of high-level visits created fertile ground for cooperation and partnership between Turkey and Russia. Another remarkable visit from the Turkish side was then-Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's visit to Russia in 1999. This was a turning point for the Russian-Turkish partnership. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a historical visit to Moscow in 2002, right after his party's election in a landslide victory. A year later, Turkish-American relations worsened due to Turkey's rejection of a package that would have allowed the US military to use Turkish soil to launch an operation in northern Iraq. The shaken relations between Turkey and the US for the first time in five decades marked a turning point in Turkish-Russian relations. Hardliner Putin regarded Turkey as a trustworthy partner in securing itself against American expansion. One year later, Putin visited Turkey, the first visit of a Russian head of state in 32 years. Then-Soviet Union Chairman Nikolay Podgorny's visit in 1973 had been the last of its kind. Two months later, Prime Minister Erdoğan organized a one-day visit to Russia. Turkish-Russian relations achieved unprecedented growth in the first half of 2009 as five top level visits have occurred in the last six months.
Russia's massive trade surplus with Turkey was also unprecedented. The annual trade volume between Turkey and Russia has reached nearly $40 billion. Russia is Turkey's biggest trade partner, and Turkey is Russia's fifth-largest trade partner. Turkey imports 67 percent of its energy from Russia. Nearly 3 million Russian tourists visit Turkey annually out of a total of 17 million tourists that come to the country.
Russian-Turkish relations did not deteriorate during the Georgian-Russian war one year ago. Subsequent to the crisis last August between Georgia and Russia over the disputed territory of South Ossetia, a Georgian territory currently controlled by Russian military forces, Russia became the subject of harsh attacks from the international community and in particular from the US. Russia has been found guilty of ignoring international norms and standards and using disproportionate force against its neighbors. In an effort to respond to all of these concerns and to try to redefine its role in the world, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev delivered a speech outlining Russia's role in the world in late August 2008.
The so-called Medvedev Doctrine embodied the claims that Russia respects international law and principles; that the world is not unipolar but multipolar; that Russia will not isolate itself from the world and will instead build favorable relations with other countries, including the US; that Russia will support its citizens and business interests wherever they are; and that Russia has privileged relations with former Soviet republics. In this context, Russia's relations with Turkey are also noteworthy. Being a close ally of both Russia and Georgia, Turkey's stance during the August crisis satisfied Russia. Medvedev expressed this during Erdoğan's visit to Moscow. Russia thanked Turkey for maintaining balance during the conflict.
Trying to position itself and contribute to the balance of power in the South Caucasus, Turkey proposed the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, including Russia. Turkey believes that the project will be a platform for cooperation, which will eventually lead to stability in the region. Azerbaijan was opposed to the platform due to Armenia's inclusion, and Russia also did not want to be involved as Georgia was expected to be a member.
In an interview with Sunday's Zaman, Turgut Gür, honorary chair of the Russian-Turkish Business Council, said, “Putin visited Turkey in December 2004, and a protocol on bilateral relations was signed between the two countries.” Emphasizing the considerable increase in relations since then, Gür said, “Four-and-a-half years have passed, and Turkish-Russian relations have become a multi-dimensional partnership today.” Russian Prime Minister Putin's visit to Ankara was also a reshuffling in terms of Turkey's agreement to participate in the South Stream gas pipeline, which has been seen as a rival of the Nabucco pipeline, which Turkey is heavily involved in. Turkey's desire to help Russia guarantee its southern energy sphere is a new phase that will bolster increasing Turkish-Russian relations.
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Когда турки доскакали до наших краев из своего родного Алтая они выглядели вот как этот красавчег.
Прошли годы, и теперь турки выглядят вот так.
Однако трансформация, епти
Армяно-турецкие протоколы
in Politics
Posted
Ахмед сын Давида ( еще один ёкрный dönme ? ) каждые 10 минут бубнит что от Армении ждут телодвижений на карабахском направлении.
В противном случае открытию границы не бывать.
Одновремено, ОНЛ-оглы резко прекратил истерику (в отличии от прошлого раза) и наблюбадает за процессом как человек которуму старшие земляки по Алтаю явно дали гарантии.
Когда кебабчи Эрдоган зарулил по второму кругу в Гейдаровск-на-Каспии они там явно всю стратегию обкашляли.