Ali Garh

Forumjan
  • Content count

    179
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Community Reputation

0 Neutral

About Ali Garh

  • Rank
    Հարյուրապետ Harjurapet Сотник

Contact Methods

  • Website URL
    http://

Profile Information

  • Location
    бункер Крунка

Previous Fields

  • Languages
    русский, письмено, устно
  • Age range
  1. Я наткнулся на сей шедевр на форуме рассейских „арийцев“.
  2. Я вообще не понял, хаи в Москве более кндзрот района под общинные постройки найти не ?
  3. Алтайцы-старшие не слабо лоханули алтайцев-младших. 120 баксов за тыщу кубов газа, хе хе
  4. AZERBAIJAN: BAKU WANTS SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM NATO 11/20/09 A senior Azerbaijani official said that Russia’s invasion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aspirant Georgia means that Azerbaijan needs security guarantees from NATO in exchange for its partnership with the Alliance. "A new bilateral agreement must be signed [between NATO and Azerbaijan] that will bind both sides to commitments and will provide security guarantees as events in Georgia have shown that verbal guarantees are not enough," Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov told a November 19 conference on relations between NATO and its partners, the Kavkazsky Uzel news website reported. Some NATO members are reportedly pushing for fast-track membership for Azerbaijan, which has recently stepped up its official interest in NATO cooperation. The energy-rich state has agreed to increase the number of peacekeeping troops it sends for NATO operations in Afghanistan to 90, and also to provide transit for non-military supplies related to the NATO campaign. дерзай
  5. Эти чудазвоны хотя бы время выбирали адекватно для своих заявлений что ли. Своим баранам ОНЛ-оглы обещает очередной бизимдир в . Через 2-3 дня его же МИД дёргает за рукав НАТО и просит дать Зибилбайджану гарантии безопасности чтобы их снова не поставили под .
  6. Что хуже: 1. Ездить в отпуск в Торкстан 2. Покупать торкстанские печенья в Армении 2. Покупать торкстанские полотенца в Армении 3. Покупать торкстанские стройматериалы в Армении 4. Покупать торкстанские станки/агрегаты в Армении Импорт не есть импорт, не есть импорт. Одно дело купить у турков станок. Другое дело купить торкстанские мороженое с синтетическими подсластителями чтобы потом высрать его в унитазе, пардон май френч. Контраст улавливаете ? Если уж и класть алтайцам-старшим в карман армянские деньги, то хотя бы делать это надо по умному.
  7. Азербайджан пригрозил оставить ЕС без газа Азербайджан сообщил Евросоюзу, что может переориентировать поставки газа на азиатские рынки, отказавшись от роли главного энергетического союзника Брюсселя в каспийском регионе. "Туда (в Европу - прим. "Лента.Ру") невозможно доставить газ", - заявил вице-президент Госнефтекомпании Азербайджана (ГНКАР) Эльшад Насиров. Ранее Насиров уже заявлял, что Баку может перенаправить экспортные потоки газа из Европы в Азию, если ЕС будет тянуть с определением тарифов в рамках газопровода Nabucco, который должен доставить газ из Средней Азии в Европу, минуя Россию. Столь резкие заявления из Баку последовали за срывом переговоров Азербайджана и Турции, которая является крупнейшим потребителем азербайджанского газа и его возможным транзитером в ЕС. Анкара требует, чтобы ГНКАР продолжала продавать ей газ по более низким ценам, что не устраивает Баку. Противоречия двух стран играют на руку Москве, поскольку подрывают позиции проекта Nabucco в каспийском регионе. Турция закупает у ГНКАР топливо по 120 долларов за тысячу кубометров, тогда как за российский газ платит 250 долларов. "Время новостей" писало, что в первом квартале 2010 года Россия, которая ранее подписала контракт с ГНКАР на поставку топлива, будет закупать его по цене в 190 долларов за тысячу кубометров. Хотя объемы закупок и незначительны, однако они могут быть увеличены, если Баку и Москва сочтут это необходимым. Для Nabucco цена в 190 долларов на границе с Азербайджаном слишком высока. В октябре президент Азербайджана Ильхам Алиев заявил, что Турция завела переговоры по газу в тупик, а также отказывается платить за газ рыночную цену и выставляет завышенные требования по тарифу на транзит топлива. Алиев также пригрозил продать газ России и Ирану. Баку может присоединиться к проекту газопровода из Туркмении через Узбекистан и Казахстан в Китай, растущая экономика которого требует все больше энергоресурсов. В частности, Туркмения уже решила перенаправить часть экспорта газа в Китай, а также увеличить экспорт в Иран. Запуск Nabucco намечен именно на 2014 год. При этом до сих пор непонятно, за счет каких источников будет наполняться газопровод: Азербайджан до недавнего времени считался единственной страной, которая может дать газ в Nabucco, но мощностей Азербайджана не хватит для того, чтобы заполнить газопровод целиком. Nabucco считается конкурентом "Южного потока", газопровода, который строят "Газпром" и итальянская Eni. Разведанные запасы газа в Азербайджане составляют около 1,5 триллионов кубометров газа. При этом в 2007 году страна добывала лишь 10,3 миллиарда кубометров. дерзай
  8. Что касается „радикально настроенной зибилбaджанской молодежи“ в Москве, то этим молодым кураёбам уже давно пора закрыть акаунт. По поводу же молодых рассейских патриотов (многие из которых были зачаты после пьяных вечеринок в общагах) разных мастей - скажу что это уже совсем другая песня. Их ведь курирует гебня, а у этих господ свои цели и приоритеты. Если бы была на то необходимисть, всю эту патриотично-даунскую шоблу давным давно сгребли бы в охапку и про них бы больше никто не услышал. Вся фишка в том то и состоит что у их кураторов в этом необходимости нет.
  9. Turkish Officials Admit to Playing Games with Protocols Harut Sassounian With each passing day, the games Turkish officials have been playing with the protocols are becoming more obvious and ridiculous. Throughout the long months of negotiations, I repeatedly warned that Turkish officials were not sincere in their announced intention of opening the border with Armenia and establishing diplomatic relations. By acting as if they were seeking reconciliation with Armenia, Turkish leaders simply wanted to prevent further acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide by third countries, extract maximum concessions from Armenia on Artsakh (Karabagh), and block future territorial demands from Turkey. Turkey first dragged out the negotiations until right before April 24 to preclude President Obama from keeping his promise on recognizing the Armenian Genocide. The protocols were finally signed on Oct. 10, to ensure that Armenian President Sarkisian went to Turkey to attend the soccer match between the national teams of the two countries. Meanwhile, Turkey’s leaders repeatedly announced that they would not open the border and their parliament would not ratify the protocols until Armenia returned Artsakh to Azerbaijan—even though there was no such requirement in the signed documents. More than a month has now passed since the signing of the protocols in Zurich, but there are no signs that the Turkish Parliament will ratify them anytime soon. Just before signing the protocols, Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu traveled to Azerbaijan to pledge once again that they had no intention of opening the border with Armenia until Artsakh was returned to Azerbaijan. As if these outrageous preconditions were not sufficient to shake Armenians’ confidence in the protocols, Turkish officials made no attempt to hide their deceptive designs. The Oct. 5 issue of the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet quoted Foreign Ministry officials in Ankara as stating: “The formation of a joint history commission and re-opening the border are included in the documents. However, they can be put into effect only after a solution is found to the Karabagh issue. Without a solution to the Karabagh conflict, these protocols cannot be transferred to parliament. Even then, parliament would not adopt it. So, relax.” To convince the Azerbaijanis that Turkey had no plans to ratify the protocols, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials boasted about their success in deceiving Europeans on another agreement: “Turkey had to sign a protocol with the European Union on the Cyprus issue. What happened? Did Turkey open its seaports and airports to Cypriot vessels and airplanes, after four years?” We now have solid evidence that these Turkish officials were not making an idle boast when they indicated that signing an agreement means nothing to them. In the Oct. 25 issue of Today’s Zaman, commentator Ercan Yavuz cited dozens of examples of agreements signed—but not ratified—by Turkey after the passage of many years! At present, there are 146 agreements with 95 countries, including Argentina, Azerbaijan, Libya, Slovenia, Sweden, and Syria, awaiting the approval of the parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission. The oldest—an agreement signed 26 years ago between Iraq and Turkey—is still pending ratification by the Turkish Parliament. Many other important agreements have been signed since 2004, but still not ratified! Given the Turkish record of not taking seriously commitments made on behalf of their country, it should not come as a surprise to anyone that the Turkish Parliament will not ratify the Armenia-Turkey protocols anytime soon. Of course, by not ratifying the protocols, Turkey would be breaking its written pledge of Aug. 31 to ratify the Protocols in a “timely” manner. Interestingly, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, in a recent interview with Reuters, asked: “Why sign the protocols if they are not going to be ratified?” The answer is obvious: The Turkish government is interested in creating a positive image for itself in front of the international community by appearing to want “good neighborly relations” with Armenia, without actually taking any concrete steps to do so. Armenia’s officials are sadly mistaken if they believe that Turkey will come under intense international pressure should it not ratify the protocols. Time and again, Turkey has proven its immunity from pressures applied by other countries, including the United States, as was the case on the eve of the Iraq war when Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to cross its borders to enter Iraq. If pressured from the outside, Turkish leaders will simply blame Armenia, by pointing out that it has not made any concessions on Artsakh, thereby making it impossible for the Turkish Parliament to ratify the protocols. Armenian officials have repeatedly stated that the Artsakh negotiations are unrelated to the protocols and that the Armenian Parliament would not ratify the protocols before Turkey, adding that they would scrap the agreement if Turkey failed to act in a “timely” manner. It remains to be seen whether Armenia will keep its pledge of not making any territorial concessions on Artsakh; and should Turkey refuse to ratify the protocols after the lapse of several months, will Armenia’s leaders have the courage to declare the signed protocols null and void? дерзай
  10. Трудное расставание по зибижански
  11. Dadrian: The Current Turkish-Armenian Protocols Prof. Vahakn Dadrian There are three elements in the new Turkish initiative calling for Attention: 1. The protocol on establishing diplomatic relations stipulates “commitment…for the principles of…territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers.” It also requires “the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law.” In other words the stipulation is based on the latter part of the paragraph whose basis is a misconstrued, if not faulty, interpretation of a definition of what it calls “relevant treaties of international law.” The fact is, however, that “international law” was seriously encroached upon by the signing of these “relevant treaties.” Involved are here: 1. The Treaty of Moscow, signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921 between RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) on the one hand, and (Kemalist) Turkey, on the other. The other, no. 2, the Treaty of Kars, was signed some seven months later, i.e., on October 13, 1921, between (Kemalist) Turkey, on the one hand, and the three Soviet Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other, with the participation of RSFSR. The cardinal fact is that Ankara’s Kemalist Turkey, the signatory of these twin Treaties, at that time, was not a legitimate, functioning government; rather, it was a rebel, improvised governmental set-up in contest with a then legitimately functioning government in Istanbul, then the official capital of the Empire, and ruled by a legitimate Sultan. Consistent with this fact, in a series of governmental as well as court-martial decisions, this legitimate authority on May 24, 1920, issued a death verdict against Mustafa Kemal (Takyimi Vekay-i no. 3864), and 12 days later, June 6, 1920, six of the latter’s cohorts, including Ismet (Inonu), were likewise court-martialed in absentia and were condemned to death. Whether or not Sultan’s government was popular, or its policies were deemed prudent or wise at the time, are issues that are irrelevant here. What is paramount and incontestable, however, is the fact that the Sultan was then the sole legitimate and superordinate authority of the Ottoman Empire — in contrast to the rebel character of the Kemalist government. Accordingly, any agreement, convention or treaty signed with such a government is under international law illegitimate, hence invalid. Thus, from the vantage point of “international law,” the Treaties of Moscow and Kars are bereft of legality and can, therefore, not be treated as legitimate instruments of negotiations. Moreover, the Moscow Treaty is additionally illegitimate by any standard of international law, for the reason that the RSFSR (Soviet Russia) was then not recognized by any nation-state, it then had almost the same status as the revolutionary, rebellious Kemalist regime. (It was only in 1922 when Germany, as the first nation-state, granted de-jure recognition of the Union at Prapallo). As if these legal deficiencies were not enough, Soviet Armenia, on the insistence of the Ankara government’s representatives, was excluded from the negotiations in Moscow that culminated in the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921, these Turkish representatives had adamantly objected to inclusion in these negotiations of any Armenian representative. As a result, the lack of evidence of Armenian participation is one of the most signal features in the protocols of this Treaty. It should be noted in this connection that one of the three Turkish delegates, who prevailed in Moscow for the final drafting of this Treaty, was Colonel, later in the Turkish Republic, Major-General, Sevket Seyfi (Duzgoreu). One of the foremost organizers of the Armenian Genocide, Seyfi distinguished himself in the task of recruitment, mobilization and deployment in the provinces of Special Organization’s killer bands, mostly convicted criminals especially selected and released from the empire’s prisons for this task, they played a major role in the implementation of the genocidal scheme. As to the ensuing Treaty of Kars, again it was the leaders of RSFSR, which assumed responsibility for prevailing upon the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics to accommodate the Turks, their feeble efforts of some opposition notwithstanding. That treaty in fact materialized as an extension and reconfirmation of the preceding Moscow Treaty thanks to the exertions of the dominant Bolsheviks. It is painful to point out once more the rather treacherous conduct of a certain Budu Mdivani, a Georgian, serving as a communist mediator between the military defeated agonizing Armenians who had welcomed him, and the arrogant, victorious Turks. Instead of serving the interests of his Russian masters in Moscow, he secretly tried to collude with the Turks, urging Kazim Karabekir, their military commander, not to be satisfied with the Arax River as a new frontier between Armenia and Turkey, but rather to push beyond that river deep into Armenia. (Kazim Karabekir, ISTIKAL Harbimiz, the 1969 edition. Istanbul, Turkiye Publishers, p. 952) 2. The protocol no. 2 dealing with the theme of “Development of Relations between Armenian and Turkey” seductively starts as item no. 1 with a promise to “open the common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol.” Then, under items no. 2 and no. 3 come the two most critical issues preventing the bulk of the Armenian people from considering reconciliation. Through them, the unrepentant heirs of the Great Crime of 1915 are once more seeking to railroad the central issue by way of indirection, covert language and resort to alluring, seductive techniques. The Armenian government should declare unequivocally, if not emphatically, that there is nothing to “examine scientifically” with respect to the matter that covertly but allegorically is called “the historical records.” These records” have been subjected to criminal investigation by a Turkish military Tribunal in the pre-Kemalist, postwar Turkey, 1919-1921. Relying on a vast corpus of authenticated, official Turkish wartime documents, this Tribunal, demonstrated that these “records” were nothing but a repository of incontestable evidence of a gigantic crime, a centrally organized mass murder enacted against the bulk of the Ottoman Empire’s own Armenian citizens. The bill of charges, the key indictment, replete with specific documentary material that constituted the Tribunal’s evidence-inchief renders the resulting series of Verdicts an irrevocable evidence of the comprehensive scale of the wartime extermination. The prosecutors were Turks, the judges were Turks, and equally, if not most important, most of the witnesses were Turks, including the high-ranking military officers. Likewise, the court-martial proceedings were based on Ottoman Turkish domestic penal laws. One would think that a government driven by a sense of Justice would above all tackle these court proceedings in its quest for truth and justice. But, remarkably, there is not only silence about them, but complete silence about the disappearance of the respective trial records following the capture of Istanbul by the Kemalists in the Fall of 1922. The proposal of enlisting commissions to “study” the problem and “formulate recommendations,” has all the sly elements of purposive procrastination, of a gimmick to inject uncertainty, ambivalence, and above all pressure for, ultimate compromise. We see here the use of standards of a “give and take” culture that often determines the outcome of such “commissions” and “sub-commissions,” presumably consisting of people knowledgeable about the Ottoman language. Perhaps the most unusual and, therefore, in a sense, bizarre aspect of this whole protocol, a feature of decades-long official Turkish posture, is the idea that, the Turks, identified with the perpetrator camp, would visit a vis-à-vis those representing the victim of population, and negotiate as co-equals. Underlying this vagary of sheer power play is the fact that Turkey, whether officially or unofficially, is still irrevocably committed to a posture of denial as far as the key element of the crime is concerned, namely, a state-sponsored and state-organized mass murder against her Armenian citizens. Indeed, Articles 300, 309, but especially 301, of Turkey’s current Penal Code, will as long as they are in effect, continue to legitimize and even extol this posture. 3. Given the track record of the Turkish politicians, the heirs of an established and centuries-old Ottoman tradition, it is difficult to resist the temptation to label this entire initiative a clever stratagem to lure the Armenian government into a trap. There is not only a scheme of prolongation of the diplomatic traffic in an atmosphere of continuous uncertainty, as far as a final outcome is concerned (Abdul Hamid skilfully used this tactic when confronting the European Powers, which were pressuring him to finally implement the so-called Armenian Reforms — in Turkish it is called Ovalamak), but also an underlying design to promptly wrest from the government of Armenia, a long-cherished concession: the formal recognition of the existing borders between Armenia and Turkey. Secondly, there is Turkey’s looming goal of joining the European Union. Turkey needs to preserve the appropriate façade of conciliatoriness that is but expected of a candidate worthy of becoming an integral part of a civilized Europe. When reinforced by the possession of significant strategic assets and the leverage of distinct military power, however, such facades can prove very functional. The situation becomes even more enigmatic, if not outright deceptive, when taking into account the pervasive current linkages between the republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Knowing the intensity of the latter’s frustrations if not fury, in relation to Armenia, and Turkey’s significant dependence of Azeri oil, not to speak of other kinship ties, are we to believe that the Turkish Republic earnestly and honestly is prepared to cement new ties with Armenia that by definition are bound to hemorrhage its relationship with Azerbaijan? Even though Armenia is, and for the foreseeable future, will remain, more or less isolated, and in some respects even economically handicapped, there is such a thing as the principle of essential national priorities and, consequently, the eternal need for circumspection and exigent vigilance. Professor Dadrian is the director of Genocide research at the Zoryan Institute.
  12. @ Zinvor Я не понял, а причем здесь Менахем Моисеевич Мендельсон ? У мендельсонов сейчас вообще сок по поводу того что Турция все больше и больше выскaльзывает из их рук. Муниципалии под контролем эрдогановской партии ач у дзах запрещают в ресторанах алкоголь, дружбанят с Сирией, Ахмаденижаду вон гонахлых устроили, Израиль попросили пешком постоять в предверии натовских маневров, армейскую верхушку все больше берут за яйца и т.д. и т.п. Вот такая вот самостоятельная наглость co стороны турок. Талмудисты же не для этого установили там кемалистксий режим ! Похоже на то что турецкий ишак таки вырвался из стойла и понесся по просторам. И гуд лак теперь талмудистам загнать его обратно.
  13. Готовьтесь к очередному раунду поиграванием жопой со стороны турок. Протоколы если и будут рассматриваться кочевным парламентом, то не раньше следующего года. Догадайтесь с трех попыток в каком месяце и почему...
  14. Когда собирается большая компания, отдельно накрывают детский столик. Туда сажают детей до 10 лет. Чтобы не мешали компании взрослых. Вот точно так можно выделить зибижанский столик. Пускай там тискают друг другу про румыно-болгарские корни армян, кражу алтайских музыкальных инструментов, блюд алтайской кухни, элементов кочевной архитектуры, бизимдир, али-байрамлинские хачдаши, традиции толерантности геокчая, кафанские трубы, лачинские концлагеря и т.п. Главное чтобы свой идиотизм они держали сконцентрированно в одном месте и не мусорили в других частях форума.