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1.ia prosto poprosil shtobi vi ne otritsali, potomy po zakonam etogo foruma ne razrishaetsa postirovat' soobshenia kotorie protivorechat zakonam Respybliki Armiania. 2.ne tol'ko inostrantsam no vsem mojno dymat' kak oni xotiat, govorit' toje koneshno mojno, no otritsat' Genocid eto bydet oskarbleniem dlia nashego naroda i pamiati nashix dedov. 3. segodnia xoroshego kak ia tak i bol'shinstvo Armian i Tyrkov toje, ne vijy v nashix otnosheniax, i voobshe kakie y nas otnoshenia segodnia, pochti nikakie. V bydyshem ia nadeiys' chto bydyt normal'nie otnoshenia, i eto vashemy pravitel'stvy reshat' kogda4. izviniaiys' ne ponial voprosa

i pojalyista ne nado otratsat' zdes' fact Genocida tak kak po zakony Armenii eto zapreshaetsa

ti prav Armiane nikogda nebili smertel'no opasnimi, vidish ti sam eto priznal chto nilogichno, no Genocid bil, Evreei toje nebili smertel'no opasnimi no Holocost toje bil.vsio chto mi xoteli eto imet' pravo na vinosimyiy jizn' na svoix zemliax.

i potom ego izbrali ne Ervantsi a grajdani Armenii

ia yje obiasnil, on ne chyjak on Armianin, on skazal chto ne otdast nikakix territorii Azerbaijany do polnogo priznania nezavisimosti i on sderjal svoio slovo

1.v konce veka -vi pishete-eto posle sozdaniya vo francii antitureckoi partii-a do etogo?2.Xristian ponyatno - a armyan v chastnosti?Vi schitaete antixristianskuu politiku turok - i antiarmyanskuu edinnoi ili eto neskolko roznoe..3.v tkom sluchae pochemu oni etogo ne sdelali let na 50 ili200 ranishe?4.pochemu turki vibrali stol neudobnoe vremya dlya sebya 1915 god April-voina,prichem ne pobedonosnaya i vdrug -snimaut regulyarnuu armiu i vpered-ne logichno!poyasnite?nadeus vi znaete ix versiu? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. prichiom tyt eto?2. ia imenno napisal pro Armian3. potomy chto boialis' chto Armenia kak Balkanskie strani rano ili pozdno polychit nezavisimost'4. potomy chto vremeni nebilo jdat', Ittihat tol'ko prishol k vlasti i oni obeshali reshit' Armianskii vopros po-tyretski raz i navsegda.

otrivok iz moego posta v Rossia i Armiane"However the Armenian side made it clear that neither, the economic blockade nor the pressure from the West is likely to change its support for Karabakh independence. When the former President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian was willing to accept a staged solution to the conflict, which meant that Karabakh would give the territories occupied from Azerbaijan without its independence being recognised, he was forced to resign."------on ne pobedil voiny, pobedili te kto voevali, esli bi ne on to mi bi vziali vsiy territoriy do reki Kyr. on etogo ne dal.

kak erevanci izbrali karabaxca-on zhe v ix ponyatii slishkom pereferiinii?ili net? ----------------------------------------------------------Karabakhtsi takie je Armiane kak Erevantsi, Rossiskie Armiane, Amerikanskie Armiane, Tyretskie Armiane itd. vse Armiane ravni

raznie mneniya xodili ob ego otstavke-chto vi schitaete prvdoi-----------------------------------------------------------ego vignali i vsio. on stal chyjim sredi svoix liydei, svoego naroda.ne vajno kak ego zastavili yxodit' no te kto eto sdelali (Kocharian i ko.) molodtsi. Daje esli oni mnogo ne delaiyt dlia strani, to chto ix vignali eto yje mnogoe

v osnovnom iranci rabotaushie v s armeniei azerbaidzhanci-kaketo .....zakrivut glaza ili oni drugie chem ix severnie i zapadnie bratani? ------------------------------------------------------------v mire biznesa natsional'nosti ne syshestvyet, krome etogo rano ili pozdno granitsi i tak otkroiytsa.

to Tyrokgrybaia xronologia Genocidapervie krypnie ybiistva Armian proizoshlo pri Sultane Hamide(300,000 pogibli v Kilikii pri niom), ego po-nekotorim istochnikam Armiene xoteli ybit', no pokyshenie ne ydalos'. no do etogo Armiane jili v ochen' plaxix ysloviax. Tyrki vsio vremia ograbili i ybivali armian. v Istambyle Armiane bili bogatimi i yvajaemimi i daje odaljivali den'gi pravitel'stvy, no vo vsiakom slychae 1 golos Mysyl'manina bila ravna 10 golosam Xristianina v sydebnix protsessax. Pervie massovie ynichtojenia armian sovershilis' v kontse 1800ix. Osmani otobrali vse oryjia ot Armian (daje kyxonnie noji), takje vsex molodix liydei zabrali v armiy, i nalogi postavili desiat' raz vishe chem na drygix, eta bila pervaia stadia podgotovki genocida.April 23 bila bol'shaia vecherinka pravitel'stva gde prisytsvovala pochti vsia elita (tak je mnogo Armian)April 24 1915 god- Armianskyiy elity arestovali, mnogie dymali chto eto nedarazymenie, no kak viasnilos' ix potom ybiyt. v drygix slovax golovy otrybili, a telo bez golovi legko ynichtojat'Genocid armian prodoljalsia do 1923 goda.

Ter-Petrossian doma sidit i ne vixodit, tol'ko ego jena vixodit v gorod inogda, a on boitsa, govriat y stadiona Ararat chornii dom ego. nedavno posetil Ameriky i daval lektsiy Armianam v Hardvarde chto vizvalo slyxov bydto on xochet vozrashiatsa v politiky, po-televizeniy on vozderjaetsa ot kommentariev, govorit shto tol'ko cherez pary let bydet govorit s pressoi, no ego 'blizkie' govoriat chto y nego net namerenia vozrashiatsa.

est chorrord ishkanytiyn no tol'ko na armianskom iazikehttp://www.chi.am

fact est' chto nashi kommynisti bili samimi prodajnimi iz vsex, i.e. oni bili agentami Rossii prejde chem Armianami. Simon Vratsian podrobno opisivaet sityatsiy pervoi Respybliki v svoei knige Hayastani Hanrapetutiyn, kotorii on napisal v 1928 no v Armenii izdali tol'ko v 93-om (iz-za kommynistov)

Ia razgovarival po-telefony s drygom kotorii tam rabotaet, on skazal chto tokogo ne bydet i ochen' ydivilsia chto takie slyxi xodiat

osobenno fotografia sleva bolee poxoja na Zemly chem sama Zemlia

ok Merk, prosto ego ia napisal, xotel prochitat' vashe mnenie i zamechania,mojet chto-to pmeniat' itd.

mne toje tak kajetsa, tem bolee na takoe damskoe nazvanie kak primdona, navernoe nedarazymenie

The Foreign Policy Of Russia And USA Towards CaucasusIntroduction In the middle of the meeting point of Russia, Turkey ad Iran, or Europe and Asia, or the East and the West lays a unique geographical entity known as Caucasus. Throughout the history the location of the region has been its worst enemy with major powers of the world trying to get the control of it. This resulted in the region rarely seeing a long period of peace and stability. Indeed the USSR period cooled down the conflicts and with Soviet domination very little was known about the region to the rest of the world. However after the collapse of the Soviet Empire three Trans-Caucasian republics became independent states able to shape their own foreign policy. The terms Trans-Caucasia or South Caucasus are more accurate when referring to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Northern Caucasus-Adygea, Karachay-Cherkesia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Osetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan is a part of Russian Federation and cannot have an independent foreign policy from it, therefore I will concentrate mostly on the three South Caucasus republics. In a short period of ten years of independence a number of states have developed their interests in the region. To Russia the region is of more important from strategic point because it can influence the security of it's southern borders. The presence of Russian military in Caucasus proves that Russia is very much concerned about it. Russia also used the number of conflicts that arose from the break-up of USSR to gain more influence there. On the other hand while US is also concerned with geopolitical importance of the region, its economic interests, which mainly constitute of the regions' oil industry, also play a significant role in shaping the foreign policy. The politics of oil in the Caucasus is very significant. I will try to provide sufficient information on oil reserves and how far the oil influences foreign policy of USA and Russia towards the region. Even though there has not been any significant investment in the region yet the prospective of future developments remain. Any pipeline from Caspian Sea to Europe has to go through Caucasus, therefore US tries to have the Caucasian countries on their side to secure the exploitation of Caspian oil resources. The complex issues shaping the foreign policies of two major powers will be examined in the rest of the essay.Russia's PolicyRussia's Historic Role In the eyes of Russian politicians Caucasus has been viewed as Russia's traditional influence. This view is backed by the fact that the whole region became a part of Russian Empire back in the 19th century. The people of Caucasus had different opinions on Russia from time to time and vice versa. In the 19th century the Christian population of Caucasus, particularly Armenians, saw Russia as a Christian country able to protect them from more powerful Muslim neighbours. While Azerbaijani people have tried to maintain good ties with the Ottoman Empire because of their linguistic and cultural ties. Although geographically South Caucasus is a single entity, which stretches from Great Caucasian mountains to Araz River, not once the different ethnic groups of the region had a common political orientation. In the early twentieth century Caucasus remained a part of Russian Empire, however when the communist revolution took place and Lenin promised 'the land to people' the Russian soldiers rushed to go back and claim their share. These events left South Caucasus free from Russian military presence and in 1920 three short-lived republics came into existence, until being reconquered by red army in 1922. These events had a great impact on shaping the conscience of the nations in Caucasus. Particularly Armenians and to some extent Georgians have realised that relying on Russia cannot guarantee their safety. The abandoning of the region by Russia in the early twentieth century gave rise to conflicts over disputed territories, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, when, Karabakh, a largely Armenian -populated region within Azerbaijan wanted to unify with Armenia. When the red army reconquered the Caucasus Nagorno-Karabakh was decided to remain as a part of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as an autonomous region, but the revival of violence was inevitable after the breakup of the USSR.Post Soviet Era With a lot of people from Caucasus living and working in Russia and vice versa, Russians could not even imagine of an independent Caucasus. And a kind of post-colonial mentality dominated the Russian elite after the fall of USSR.The term Near Abroad, which is referred to the newly independent republics of the former USSR, came into existence, which indicates Russia's special concern about them. But the beginning of Russian worries about its interests in Caucasus goes back a few years before the collapse of the USSR. In late 1980's the ethnic tensions arose to very high levels in Caucasus. Unresolved territorial disputes from post-Soviet era developed into open conflicts, which are Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Gorbachev's Perestroika and the attempt to democratise Soviet Union reduced the previous fears of Moscow's suppression of any conflicts within the USSR. When it became clear that a conflict is inevitable the Soviet government tended to support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity because of the fears of spreading the conflict. In addition to that when the Armenian Pan-National Movement (APNM) took the control of Armenia it had a very anti-Russian attitude questioning the role Russia should play in the region. The fears of being abandoned, as on a number of occasions previously, have made the APNM to seek closer ties with the West, however expressing hope that Russia would change its attitude towards the republics. In other words the APNM government was pro-Yeltsin and anti-Gorbachev and the foreign policy of Russia towards the region became the victim of the 'power struggle' within Soviet Union between the conservatives (Gorbachev) and reformists (Yeltsin). (1) This power-struggle eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, emergence of fifteen independent states and a lot of trouble in the territory of former USSR. The independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was widely welcomed by the general public of the states. By 1992 many countries had recognised the independence of the republics. However the sudden collapse of USSR had a big negative impact on the Caucasus. The total collapse of economy, ethnic conflicts and political unrest has made the region very vulnerable to external intervention. Particularly Russia was not willing to share its geopolitical interests with others. The immediate years following the independence saw emergence of nationalistic governments in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Abulfas Elchibey in Azerbaijan and Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, making an attempt of a radical disorientation of their politics towards the West. However they miscalculated the strength of Russia's invisible hand and the consequences were tragic for both countries. Russia's fear of losing its importance in the region led no choice but to use the old tactics, used by all colonial powers, of divide and rule. In Georgia, Gamsakhurdia's leadership lasted only for about a year. His anti-Russian rhetoric and refusal to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) resulted in Russia getting increasingly worried about Georgia's orientation. Gamsakhurdia's ultranationalist ideas which were against Russia's interests in the region eventually led to Russia manipulating internal division in Georgia and replacing Gamsakhurdia with Eduard Shevarnadze. (2) The division within Georgian society also meant armed struggle for succession of two autonomous regions of Georgia. The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have devastated the newly independent republic. Gamsakhurdia has counted on help from the West to be able to handle the Russian power, however his presidency matched the period described by many as the 'Russo-Western honeymoon': the immediate years of break-up of USSR when Russia had close ties with the West. It was not till March 1992 when Shevarnadze came to power and put efforts to normalise relations with Russia. Georgians also hoped that with the return of Shevarnadze they could win support for the war against Abkhazia. Even though Shevarnadze was generally viewed as a pro-Russian leader, his number of appeals to Moscow for help in resolving domestic problems of of separatism and Gamsakhurdia loyalists' terror against his goevrnment, the Yeltsin administration has done little to support him till late 1993. By this time Tbilisi had lost control over Abkhazia and Russia's support very little directed against the Gamsakhurdia loyalists only, which was far less from what Georgians expected. The price Georgia had to pay for the Russian support was joining the CIS and allowing Russian military bases in Georgia. Georgia has also allowed the Russian peacekeeping forces to patrol the Abkhaz border. The Azerbaijan's fate regarding Russia's policy in the first years of independence was similar to Georgia's. Just after a year since Azerbaijan gained independence a pro-Turkish, anti-Russian leader Abulfas Elchibey gained the power. He was backed by a nationalist Azerbaijan's Popular Front party. During his presidency Elchibey put every effort to diminish the Russian power. His foreign policy was based on Turkey, while strongly identifying Azerbaijani people and Azeri culture with the Turkish one. The Azerbaijani language is very similar to Turkish and they also share a common religion. With his extreme pro-Turkish and anti-Russian, anti-Iranian attitude it did not take long time to destroy the relations with its neighbours, Russia and Iran. As an answer to the Azerbaijan's pan-Turkic tendencies Russia has shifted it's support to Armenians during the Karabakh conflict. In the early days of the Karabakh conflict Russia tended to support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, however Elchibey's policies have resulted in Russia providing some support to the Armenians fighting for self-determination. Particularly when Azerbaijan was seriously defeated in Karabakh, Elchibey counted on the support of Turkey. In Turkey also there were big demonstrations to put pressure on the government to help 'Azerbaijani brothers liberate' Karabakh. Thus when Turkey made a number of warnings about a possible military intervention, the CIS commander-in-chief Marshal Shaposhnikov made a threatening statement warning that any intervention by Turkey would result in the 'Third World War' (3). Although many Azerbaijani sources have also claimed that Russia was directly involved in the conflict, nothing like that has been proven. By the time of the military coup, which brought the former head of Azerbaijan during the communist era- Heidar Aliev back to power, the Azeri army had already experienced serious defeats in and outside of Karabakh. The very first step of Aliev was to improve the relations with Russia. Just like Shevarnadze he immediately joined the CIS, with the hope of gaining support for resolving the Karabakh conflict. Russia did not make any radical decisions to resolve the conflict in favour of Azerbaijan, however, it managed to negotiate a ceasefire in May 1994. Russia had also hoped for peacekeeping mission in Karabakh but Aliev has strongly opposed it. Aliev argued that Russian troops from Armenia should not be deployed on the border, because he knew that Russian military could not afford financially to bring more troops from Russia itself. Russia, on the other hand, opposed any OSCE peacekeeping mission, thus untill now there are no peacekeepers patrolling the Karabakh-Azerbaijan border. Aliev's attempt to reduce Russia's power was partly successful in this regard, in Moscow's view, however, the anti-Russian attitude of Azerbaijan meant that Russian presence should be established in Armenia in order to balance the region's power. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia became members of a loose group of countries known as GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), the aim of which was to reduce Russia's power with the CIS. This group has not been very successful in it yet, however, it is clear that it does not share common strategic interests with Russia. Ever since independence, Armenia did not experience any internal conflicts like its neighbours-Azerbaijan and Georgia. However it was the worst economically hit country after the collapse of USSR with the county's GDP falling by 50% in a single year alone. There were political reasons behind this economic collapse. Azerbaijan has always argued that its conflict with Karabakh was not an internal one but an international, meaning that Azerbaijan was fighting against Armenia, not Karabakh Armenians. This resulted in Azerbaijan and its closest ally Turkey blockading Armenia. While during the first years of independence the Armenian government made efforts to improve relations with Turkey and the West, the blockade imposed by Turkey damaged the relations and Armenia became very vulnerable to external influence from Russia. Of course the US asked Azerbaijan and Turkey on a number of occasions to lift the blockade, which the latter refused and resulted in US Congress passing the resolution 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which restricts direct aid to Azerbaijan. However it will be discussed later when dealing with the US policy. Because of the reasons mentioned above the Armenian -Russian relations have been very warm after the USSR. During the economic crisis of 1992-1993 in Armenia, Russia has provided a number of credits and loans, which helped Armenia at a time of trouble. Russia has also supported Armenia's military development and energy supplies. During the 1990's a number of treaties have been signed between Armenia and Russia on cooperation, friendship etc. There was a good deal of understanding between Russia's ex-president Boris Yeltsin and Armenia's ex-president Levon Ter-Petrossian on one hand and between high government and military officials on the other. Armenia has also allowed Russia to have its military presence in the republic. Russian troops guard the Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Iran borders which are of utmost strategic importance to Russia. This move was strategically beneficial for both countries, since Armenians have a historic distrust of Turkey and Russia wants to keep a strong presence in Caucasus. Even though Georgia also allowed Russian border-guards to control its border with Turkey, it was pressurised to do so and it did not last long either. By the year 2001 the Georgian troops became in control of their border replacing the Russian ones. This left Armenia the only reliable partner to Russia. Russian politicians mention this fact very often, especially after September 11 2002. It is true that Armenia remained a pro-Russian attitude throughout post-Soviet era and a strategically important partner too, however economically Armenia has little to offer. Economic Interests And Conflicts Although the Caucasian economies are very weak at the moment, there is a big potential of development and both USA and Russia have developed significant economic interests in the region. The biggest interest in Caucasus is the development of Azerbaijan's oil industry and the potential transport corridor between linking Central Asia with Europe and Russia with the South. While Russia's interest in Caucasus in the first years of independence was more of a strategic one, at the end of 1990's it also developed significant economic interests. The Caspian Sea oil has played an important role for the region throughout the history. The availability of oil gave Azerbaijan's leadership more space for manoeuvring, which also raised fears amongst Armenians that Russia would abandon them for the potential profits. The Azerbaijani leadership has started negotiations with the Western oil companies seeking to reduce Russia's power. Their goal is to construct a pipeline from Baku (Azerbaijan) to Ceyhan in Turkey and export the oil to the West. Moscow insisted to have a role in Azerbaijan's oil production, and in late 1993 the president of Russia's biggest oil company LukOil visited Baku and signed an agreement with Azerbaijan State Oil Company (SOCAR) about cooperation. In 1994, when an agreement was signed with a consortium of eleven countries LukOil also participated. The British Petroleum (BP) played the leading role in the deal which made Moscow increasingly unhappy with its smaller role in the deal and the next day the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the UK saying that 'Russia reserved the right to take appropriate measures against Caspian states that started to exploit the seabed unilaterally'. (4) The cheapest route of an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the West is through Armenia, however the Azerbaijani government rejects this plan because of the unresolved Karabakh conflict. The reason behind this is to win support over Karabakh's status. With the countries interested in the pipeline project and Azerbaijan's oil in general putting pressure on the Armenian side for a compromise they are more likely to achieve it. However the Armenian side made it clear that neither, the economic blockade nor the pressure from the West is likely to change its support for Karabakh independence. When the former President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian was willing to accept a staged solution to the conflict, which meant that Karabakh would give the territories occupied from Azerbaijan without its independence being recognised, he was forced to resign. The other potential route is through Georgia, which is not very stable too. The ethnic tensions in Georgia make it very risky place for an oil pipeline to be constructed. Russia can manipulate a renewed conflict in Caucasus to prevent a radical reorientation. A good example is when recently the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakhetti region which is largely populated by ethnic Armenians, have started to be discussed by Georgia's high-ranking politicians, all of a sudden the tensions grew very high between the central Georgian government and some Armenian organisations demanding autonomy for the region. The future pipeline route carrying Azerbaijan's and possibly Central Asia's oil to the West will have a dramatic effect on Caucasus' economic and political orientation. Russia favours a pipeline that passes through its territory not only for reasons of profit, but to prevent Caucasus from drifting out of its economic sphere of influece. However it is a fact that Russia's economic decline has began a decade ago and the Caucasus' trade with it has fallen sharply with now accounting for less than 30% of the total. (Source UN/ECE, Economic Survey of Europe). Another reason for Russia opposing the Caspian pipeline project is that Azerbaijan is a competitor as Caspian Sea exploiter. The legal status of the Caspian Sea is still a major unresolved issue between Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. There is also the future possibility of a gas pipeline between Turkmenistan to Armenia via Iran. The Armenia-Iran relations have been very warm during the past decade till now, which Russia does not really mind and the infrastructure has been repaired to some degree after independence. However US opposes a possible gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia. The possible gas pipeline, which is scheduled to be constructed from the end of 2002, will decrease Armenia's and Georgia's dependence on Russia's energy supplies. The prospective of region being a transit route are very much interrelated with, and as complex, as the pipeline issues. Again it is totally dependent on the peace process, and if peace is achieved it is a source of potential wealth for all countries. The new Silk Road will connect Europe with the Far East, and Russia with the South. The most significant project to be realised is the European Union Project of Transportation Corridor connecting Europe and Asia (TRASECA). The volume of trade via this route will be very high within a matter of time and will boost the economies not only of the South Caucasus but Europe, Central Asia and the East as well.NATO-Caucasus Relations And Russia NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has been launched in 1994 with the aim of increasing transparency in national defence planning and military budgeting; ensuring democratic control of national armed forces and developing, over the longer term, Partner country forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO members. In Caucasus Georgia has been the most enthusiastic of three about it, and Armenia the least. To a large extent it demonstrates the relations with Russia. Russia, of course, has opposed any active involvement of NATO in Caucasus and vice versa. Although Russia and NATO signed the Founding Act for the PfP, Russia still remains very suspicious on its activities in Caucasus. 'The imperial mentality is still largely present in Russian society as well as in ruling circles. Russia has not adjusted to new realities, including new realities inside herself, and still uses old methods to promote her ambitions and to keep military influence outside of her borders.' (5) Russia still has the ambitions of having a central role in the CIS and makes every attempt for the member countries to be involved in a number of strategic alliances such as the CIS Joint Security Systems. Russia sees the NATO involvement in Caucasus as a direct threat to its interests and condemns it as interfering with its domestic affairs. NATO understands this and therefore tries not to upset Russia. For example Georgians have ambitions of joining the NATO, however it is not likely to happen very soon, at least not until Russia joins NATO itself. However the changes during the past years have been significant. Armenia and Azerbaijan have become more cooperative members of the PfP program and NATO is planning to have its biggest military exercises in South Caucasus in summer 2002 where both Armenia and Azerbaijan will take part too. It could well be argued that the 21st century began with Russia losing a lot of influence in Caucasus, and the PfP is a part of it. The PfP will eventually make the Caucasus a safer region for major economic projects such as the TRACECA.Summarising Russia's Policy It is true that Russia has played an important though not unilateral role in the region during the past decade. With what many describe now as the 'post-colonial mentality' in Russia's leadership's mind it's foreign policy can be unstable. However, there are a number of other reasons for Russia to be concerned about Caucasus apart from its geopolitical interests, such as drug-trafficking, migration, terrorism, organised crime and Islamic fundamentalism. The level of migration from the Caucasus republics, both refugees and economic migrants, is very high with different estimates indicating more than a million. On the other hand the whole question concerning Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia is whether Russia will prefer a strategic or economic interest in Caucasus and how will they be interrelated. During the Yeltsin era it was clear that the strategic interests outweighed the economic ones however it seems that Vladimir Putin has taken a more economic approach of resolving the political issues. After being elected as the president, while many thought that Armenia would be the first Caucasus country for Putin to visit, it turned to be that he went to Azerbaijan first which raised doubts in Armenia whether Moscow still wants to play an active geopolitical role in the region. And generally it seems that Putin is more concerned with the economic issues. Even Azerbaijan's president Aliev has complained recently that Russia does not have a clear policy about which side is it on in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. The no war-no peace situation is in Russia's interest to keep the region from reorienting towards West. If peace is achieved, most likely the whole region will shift it's orientation towards the West, which Russia does not want to happen, however it is clear that this situation cannot last very long either, and the US military in Georgia 'fighting against terrorism' is not good news for Moscow. However this issue will be discussed separately, because of the big changes in the world politics after the September 11, 2001. One thing is clear though-Russia's foreign policy can be very unstable with its leadership's habit of personalising politics, and if the wrong government is put in power, Caucasus will be the first region to suffer from it. The US Policy Towards Caucasus The US foreign policy and interests towards Caucasus have been different from the Russian ones. To US Caucasus is a newly discovered region about which very little was known or discussed fifteen years ago. However during the past ten years US has developed significant interests. Although many argue that the main US interests in the region are economic ones, the way to achieve is by promoting stability, peace and democracy. In addition to that there are a number of geopolitical interests that US has in the region. Today US are the most important extra-regional actor in Caucasus. The US government has put significant efforts in stabilising the region. The possible oil pipeline, which would transport the early Caspian Sea oil to the West, has been very attractive for US, which has been trying to decrease its dependence on the Middle Eastern oil recently.The View From Caucasus The Caucasus countries have welcomed the increased US interest in the region. Indeed the most pro-American country in Caucasus is Georgia, because it is very unhappy about losing control over the secessionist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with Russia's help. In other words the pro-Americanism of Georgia is the result of bad relations with Russia. Georgia has long-term visions of joining the NATO some day, which spoils the relations with its northern neighbour even further. Azerbaijan also views the possible American domination of the region as a positive development. It is clear that Russia is not and cannot be a reliable destination of oil exports therefore the US sponsored pipeline construction to the West would significantly reduce Russia's influence. The other reason why Azerbaijan prefers to deal with US rather than Russia is because Turkey, which is culturally and linguistically linked to it, is one of the most important allies of the US and with increased American influence they will have a greater power in the region. While Azerbaijan and Georgia consider US as the only reliable force able to reduce the Russian domination, Armenia views US as a very important economic and political partner, able to support the newly-born democracy and promote stability in the region as a whole. One reason why Armenia has not been enthusiastic about US domination over Caucasus is because of the amount of support that Turkey receives from US. Moreover, the Armenian governments do not want to lose Russia's support, which has been very important during the past decade. However, despite Armenia's pro-Russian policy, it is not anti-American either. The long-term goal of the Armenian elite is to further develop relations with the West, since Russia's gradual withdrawal from the region seems inevitable, because of the weakened economic and military capabilities.Political Developments And Oil Pipelines The US government established diplomatic ties with the three Caucasus countries in the first half of 1992. Eventually the aim of US policy in the region became encouraging democratisation, political reforms and respect for human rights, creating stable market based economies where American business interests would be respected, and assisting the countries' efforts to reduce weapons of mass destruction and radioactive components inherited from the USSR. The Clinton administration has not paid special attention to the region till 1995. Before 1995 US policy-makers have been concentrating their energy on developing relations with Russia, therefore Caucasus issues have not been a top priority for the US during the first four years of Clinton presidency. It was partly due to worsening of Iran-USA relations that made the government to rethink its role in Caucasus. The Iranian threat produced a more active US policy in the region and in late 1995 the US encouraged the export of Azerbaijan's oil to the Black Sea port of Supsa. By encouraging a pipeline, which would carry the oil to the West, the US hoped to prevent a pipeline that would pass through Iran. However it was later realised that the export of the oil was not possible without the region's stabilisation. Therefore US decided to take a more active role in the conflict resolution by in 1996 becoming a co-chairman, along with Russia and France, of the Organization for Security and Cooperation's Minsk Group, whose objective was to negotiate peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. George W. Bush became even more interested in a settlement of the conflict and not long after being elected negotiations were organised in the Key West, the results of which are kept secret. Despite the fact that Russia continuously pressurised Azerbaijan to refrain from the US backed pipeline project, president Aliev made it clear that the project will be realised. In response to Russia's demands the US declared its intention to promote the development of an additional pipeline across the Caspian Sea that would link Central Asian energy resources with the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, further reducing Russia's and Iran's role. Moreover the Clinton Administration created a new post of the Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy. This move further proved the importance of the region to the US. The oil reserves of the Caspian Sea are large enough for US companies to invest big sums of money. As the table below shows if a pipeline is to be constructed it can be used to export Azerbaijan's and Central Asia's oil to the West together possibly summing up to more than 100 billion barrels. Many experts question these figures arguing that the actual reserves are likely to be much less. However even if the reserves are not large enough for significant profits, the American policy makers are well aware of the strategic role the pipeline can play. The East-West pipeline project has been highly politicised both by the US and Azerbaijan. First of all the pipeline will help US ally-Turkey both economically and in increasing influence in Caucasus. In other words it is viewed as a low-cost way of gaining influence in the Russian dominated Caucasus region. The Turkish factor plays a very important role in the US policy towards Caucasus. The pipeline is a golden opportunity for US to pay back for the Turkish support during the Gulf War.Turkey is also considered by the US as one of the few democratic Muslim countries. The Turkish influence will prevent the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The US pipeline will most importantly curb the Iranian influence, which is very often accused as a terrorism supporter, drug-trafficker and an unfriendly state. Although Iran has already a developed infrastructure of pipelines and can be a very cheap way of transportation the US has critically opposed any Iranian involvement. Particularly in 1995 president Clinton personally demanded that the National Iranian Oil Company be excluded from the Azerbaijani oil consortium. This proves that US is also mostly concerned about geopolitical interests rather than commercial ones. The US big corporations have long been lobbying for a lift of the ban of investment by American companies in Iran. Officially US companies can invest up to $20 million a year, however the European companies have much more favourable conditions for investing in Iran, and the direct American investment has remained very low. The US-Iran relations still remain very cold and one report noted the Azerbaijan vs. Armenia and the US vs. Iran situation can bee described as a new Cold War. (6) Many American politicians have also warned Armenia against constructing a natural gas pipeline through Iran. The Armenian government sees this demand as unfair because Iran is the only neighbour with whom it enjoys good political relations and significant trade. Moreover the US demands are somehow counterbalanced by the Russian support, which allows the local governments to manoeuvre between Russia and the US very often, and in the gas pipeline project case Russia strongly supports it, which makes it a very realistic one. The pipeline routes are at the centre of the US governments however the future of it remains uncertain. While the Clinton administration had a vision of joint US-Russian development of the pipelines it is clear that Russia is rather concerned with the geopolitical influence. This indicates that the US Caucasus policy is a 'hostage to its Russian policy’. (7) Other Interests And Policies The US policy has also a number of other goals apart from the pipelines. Ever since the collapse of the USSR it became a matter of US prestige to help the newly independent states on their way to democratisation and stability. The war torn region was in a big need of economic aid to recover. The US has been very generous in providing aid to Armenia and Georgia and it became the largest bilateral donor to Armenia and Georgia. Most U.S. aid to the Caucasus addresses urgent needs for food, shelter, medicine, and energy, including urgent winter needs. The US has also taken into consideration the devastating affect of the blockade by Turkey in providing aid to Armenia; therefore Armenia receives more per capita aid than its neighbour Georgia. Overall the total amount of aid during the past decade provided by US has totalled to more than $1 billion. Azerbaijan, however did not receive a direct aid by the US because of the resolution 907 of the Freedom Support Act. This resolution restricted aid to Azerbaijan till it lifts the blockade of Armenia. The 907 has remained a very hot issue for Azerbaijan and on a number of occasions they accused the US Armenian Diaspora in supporting it. However the Armenian lobby in US has been counterbalanced by the oil lobby thanks to which the 907 has been suspended in 2002 as a reward for Azerbaijan's support of the War on Terror. The US also paid a special attention at such issues as human rights, democratisation and stability. The stability of the region is in US' own interests. Democracy plays an important part in US policy towards Caucasus. It is believed that the way to achieve stability is to promote democracy, and as Clinton said 'Democracies rarely wage a war on one another'. ( The local governments understand that US prefers to deal with democracies therefore they have made attempts, largely encouraged and guided by the US, to promote it. The international observers are always present during the elections and their comments are taken very seriously. Armenia and Georgia have made significant steps towards democratisation while the last Azerbaijan's presidential elections have been described as neither fair or free. (the economist november 11th 200) The NATO's PfP program was also designed to promote stability throughout the post-Soviet space. As already discussed the aim of it is to promote civilian control over military, which will stabilise the Caucasus. All three republics very often participate in military exercises within PfP program, and NATO has promoted military exercises within Caucasus a number of times. The PfP also serves the US strategic interests of reducing Russia's influence, as it is making the republics one step closer to joining the NATO. The increased NATO involvement in Caucasus is also beneficial to Turkey, which is itself one of the largest members of NATO. It is clear that the PfP serves the long-term interests of USA. Another way of assisting the Caucasus countries has been the trade and investment by US. Bilateral trade agreements have been signed between the US and the republics. Bilateral Investment Treaties providing national treatment guarantees have also been signed with Armenia and Georgia. And in February 1995, the United States granted Armenia General System of Preferences (GSP) status, allowing it to export many goods to the United States without incurring tariffs and customs duties. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all three states on financing and insuring U.S. private investment overseas. There has also been progress towards the republics' integration into the international trade organisations. Most importantly, soon all of the republics will become a member of the World Trade Organisation and other Western organisations, which will eventually increase the US-Caucasus cooperation. The US government has also tried to promote good relations between Armenia and Turkey. It has not been very successful but in the year 2001 the US sponsored Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was created aiming to normalise the relations between the two. However this programme has failed only a few months after its creation. It is very important for these two countries to have good relations to US but the two sides have not been able to reach an agreement. So far the Bush administration has only been able to persuade Ankara to lift the travel restrictions on Armenians travelling to Turkey. Non-proliferation The other area where US have placed special importance is the non-proliferation policies in Caucasus. To prevent the spread of weapons of must destruction and their technology still remains a great concern for the US. The US has made a considerable effort to develop non-proliferation policies in Caucasus and especially to eliminate the potential for the trade of the weapons of mass destruction and their technologies. This is very important because although Caucasus did not inherit such weapons from the USSR, it did have a sensitive industry, materials and technology. The conflicts of the region also added an influx of other weapons from the CIS countries. And even though the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs have mainly concentrated on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan by now the importance of Caucasus is realised. The US government has put a lot of pressure on the Armenian side to close down its nuclear power plant at Metsamor and although Armenia agreed to close it down in the year 2004, it has also demanded that USA and Europe compensate for the cost of shutting it down and help build alternative energy sources. The West and US find it increasingly important to eliminate the WMD in Caucasus because of its neighbour Iran. The Caucasus countries have paid a special attention to these policies. For them it meant to be accepted by the West and US and improve the reputation. And if the TRACECA program is realised and the East-West transport corridor passes through Caucasus then the (non) proliferation will be even bigger issue. This issue is particularly often discussed in Georgia. The export control laws will make it a less risky place for Western firms to invest there, which is the ultimate goal of Caucasus countries.Summarising US Policy The region about which US knew very little two decades ago became geopolitically and economically a very important one. During the last ten years US grew so strong in the region that now is able to challenge Russia's power. However the Russian foreign policy will affect US foreign policy towards the region, and the region's fate is largely dependent upon whether US and Russia will compete against each other or cooperate together for the region. It seems that US would rather prefer the latter however Russia remains very selfish towards the region. As we have seen during the past ten years US has made significant attempt to stabilise the region both economically and politically. The economic support has been very important for Caucasus where Russia can do very little to help. Moreover the potential economic benefits from cooperation with US are very large, and some countries have shifted their orientation completely towards it in the hope of developing pipelines and the East-West transport corridor. The US made it clear to Russia that it is strongly against its total domination of the region. And as Deputy Secretary Talbott said during his testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, March 31, 'We are against any state in the region being allowed to dominate the region, politically or economically. We will continue to work with all the states of the Caucasus to thwart the growth of Iran's influence in the region while those states strengthen their ties to Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Community'. (9) Post September 11th Developments The September11th terrorist attacks on USA have changed a lot in international relations. Arguably it marked the beginning of Russia's decline from Central Asia and Caucasus regions, and the end of post- Cold War era. Some commentators descibed the new period as the post post Cold War. The fact is that US anti-terrorism campaign has helped transform the geopolitical landscape across Eurasia, with Caucasus remaining a key region of geopolitical interest. It is very important to take into consideration the post September 11th developments when dealing with Caucasus because of the unpredictable changes that have taken place since then. It would be highly unlikely for US to gain such an active role in the region wihout the excuse of the 'war on terrorism'. The George W. Bush's famous speech, where he stated 'You are with us or against us' made the world and especially Russia realise that US was commited to the war on terrorism and Russia's gradual decline from Central Asia and Caucasus was inevitable. Moscow had realised that it could not confront US which was strongly backed by Western Europe and many other countries, therefore it decided to show some limited support for actions against Taliban. The Caucasus countries too supported the war on terrorism by allowing US airplanes the right to fly over their territories. By the time begining of the military actions in Afghanistan the US troops were present in Central Asian countries. Although Russia was not very happy about it, there was little it could do. What Moscow wouldn't predict however, was that US troops would soon be present in Caucasus too. Events In Abkhazia For Georgia's president Eduard Shevarnadze the war on terrorism was the perfect opportunity to step up relations with US, reduce Russian domination and regain control of the breakaway region of Abkhazia. The Georgian authorities claimed that Al-Quaeda fighters have been hiding in the Pankisi Gorge area of Abkhazia, and asked US for assistance in their effort to crack down on terrorism. When the talks begun about possibility of deployment of US troops in Georgia to fight suspected Al Quaeda members, the Russian foreign Ministry was quick to react with a number of speeches condemning it. As the Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the presence of U.S. troops in Georgia could ' further aggravate' the situation in the region. (10) And although many claimed that there was a deep understanding between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the sharp comments by a number of high-ranking Russian officials made it clear that Russia does not want US troops in Georgia. And even if understanding existed between Putin and Bush the Russia's military has never supported this idea and asked the Georgian government on a number of occasions to give permission to intervene in Pankisi Gorge to crash down the Chechen terrorists who supposedly have been hiding there. Georgia rejected this plan and has prefered US intervention since it would also serve their long-term strategic interests of reducing Russia's power. However, despite the serious warnings by February 2002 as many as 200 US military advisors had already arived in Georgia. The Pentagon has already provided Georgia with ten UH-1H Huey helicopters, and Georgian personnel are being trained in how to operate and maintain the aircraft, which would be used for attacks on guerrilla positions. (11) Officially the purpose of US troops' presence in Georgia is to advice local forces on tactics and weapons to use against terrorists. But it is clear that the deployment of the troops was partly because of geopolitical interests, and was welcomed in US as a big strategic victory. This attempt to stabilise Georgia will make US one step closer towards gaining control over Caspian Sea energy resources and realising the $3 billion pipeline construction project and securing its safety. The fact that thousands of US troops are already present in Central Asian countries makes the possible pipeline even more profitable since Kazakhstan's oil can also be connected to the same pipeline thus ensuring sufficient supplies to cover the costs and make significant profits. These subject has been widely discussed by Western media and during his visit to Kazakhstan Colin Powel said 'Based on the discussions we have had this morning and also the discussions I had with the American Chamber of Commerce earlier this morning, I come away even more persuaded of the critical importance that Kazakhstan will play in satisfying the energy needs of West in future years'.(12) The Role Of Turkey After 9/11 The post September 11th period has also seen a greater cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, largely encouraged by the US. These three countries have finalised an agreement on regional security. The document includes measures against combating terrorism and organized crime protection of oil pipelines, especially the US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. This agreement also will allow Turkish air base in Azerbaijan, which is opposed by Russia. The Georgia-Turkey relations have also stepped to a new level where the military ties are increasing dramatically. The Georgian military officials have been freely cooperating with their Turkish counterparts and Turkey is also making attempts to modernise Georgia's military infrastructure. The improved relations between Georgia and Turkey raised concerns in Armenia which remains Russia's only ally in the region. Many commentators have argued that the increased military ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey may lead to renewed violence in Nagorno-Karabakh. However Ankara is well aware that Russia will not yield its position on the issue, which deters Turkey from openly supporting Azerbaijan. In addition to that, Ankara felt betrayed by Azerbaijan as the latter signed an agreement with Russia on renting the Gabala radar station. The Gabala radar was built in 1985 to monitor ballistic missile launches of the Soviet Union's southern neighbors with a maximum tracking range of 7,200 kilometers, but after the independence Russia and Azerbaijan could not agree on the status and the use of the strategically important station. Under the new deal signed in 2002 the Gabala radar station, will be operated by 1,500 Russian servicemen over a 10-year lease period which will cost the Kremlin $7 million per year. At the same time, Moscow agreed to pay $31 million in overdue payments for electricity supplies to the radar over the 1997-2001 span. The agreement also says that Russia may share information received by the radar with Azerbaijan, which guarantees its confidentiality. (13) The Reward for Support The other major change after September 11th was already mentioned the suspension of section 907 of Freedom Support Act. This was partly due to the fact that US was desperatly seeking support of Muslim nations for its War on Terrorism. Azerbaijan was very quick to react to the new geopolitical environment by arresting 'suspected terrorists' to demonstrate the US that it is commited to the War on Terrorism. During his visit to Azerbaijan and Armenia the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has explained that in return of suspension of section 907, Armenia will recieve military assistance from US worth over $4 million. The military assistance to Armenia and the suspension of 907 for Azerbaijan was the reward for their support in the US war on terrorism. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia granted the Pentagon use of their airspace shortly after the war on terrorism was declared. The military ties between Caucasus and US were made available after US banned the resolution forbiding military contacts, including arms sales, to Caucasus countries. Ever since US is taking an icreasingly active military role in Caucasus. The aid serves the US aims in the region to gain more political influence and the increased aid shows the increased importance of Caucasus. Overall the US Senate approved around $50 million in Aid to Azerbaijan and around $80 million to Armenia. Georgia has also recieved considerable amount of aid, especially the military aid has increased significantly designed to help it crash down terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge. Provocation In Javakhketti The Recent developments in Georgia have given rise to new concern over the state of affairs in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia. It is a strategically located region of southern Georgia with an ethnic Armenian majority population. The region hosts a large Russian military base which Georgia asked Moscow to withdraw. This demand resulted in increased tentions between the Armenian population of the region and Georgian government. Turkish and Russian media both have blamed each other in exploiting this issue for gaining geopolitical influence. The Russian media has made serious accusations on Turkey, arguing that the withdrawal of the military base will gradually result in Turkish military presence in the region with the pretext of protecting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.(14) An online Russian agency published a report obtained from an anonymous 'group of specialists' which claimed that Turkish special services developed a plan for intervention in Javakheti. The report also claimed that Turkey aims to exacerbate relations between Russia and Georgia, while at the same time provoking a conflict between Armenians and Georgians in Javakheti. Some Turkish media sources also condemned Russian military of simply creating separatist moods amongst the Armenian population for remaining its military bases in the region. It is yet unclear who is responsible for the increased tentions, however thanks to a great deal of understanding between Armenian and Georgian diplomats the issue will not take any dramatic turn towards an open conflict. Summarising The New Caucasus The War on Terrorism has changed the whole geopolitical environment in Caucasus. It is unclear whether Russia is willing to share its geopolitical influence in the region or it had no other choice but to agree with US. The deployment of US troops in Georgia was designed as a small-scale operation however it definitly serves a broad political agenda of gradually dominating the region and securing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. And although many argue that the US military deployment in Georgia was balanced with the US support for the Russian thesis on the Chechens, that they are terrorists, it is not clear wheather it was a compromise between Washington and Moscow. To Russia's military this was a clear loss, and even many politicians are not very happy about it. And even though Putin said that the deployment of US troops was 'no tragedy' it seems that many amongst the Russian elite disagree with him. (15) And even if Russia is no longer concerned about Caucasus, the three republics are very much worried and maybe even suspicious of the new geopolitical environment in the region. Most likely the war on terrorism will remain in the history of Caucasus not so much because of region having terrorism problems, but because it marked the beginning of end of Russia's unilateral domination of Caucasus. Conclusion We have seen that Caucasus has been and still remains a geopolitically important region both for US and Russia. Its importance has both positive and negative implications on the region. On one hand we have seen that the region is at the center of attention of Russian and US policy makers therefore they will try to cooperate with the countries for mutual benefits, on the other hand this attention can be damaging very often if it turns into competition instead of cooperation. However because of the small size and power that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have, they have relied and will rely on external forces for their security and political initiatives. The Russian domination of the region is giving way to the American one and it is not clear yet what the result will be. Russia's power decline is taking step-by-step from the region. The first step was the breakup of USSR in 1991, the second step was the end of Russo-Western honeymoon in 1993-1994 when US has started developing its own interests within Caucasus, the third step was the worsening of Iran-US relations and US seeking wider role in the region in 1996 and the forth step is the current military presence in Georgia. We can see that whatever Russia abandons, is taken over by US, therefore the region will either depend upon the US or Russia, or some kind of mixture of both. But a complete independent foreign policy is highly unlikely in Caucasus. Throughout the post Soviet era Russia has been in a more advantaged situation than US in Caucasus, largely because of its traditional role, but also because of the fact that they are very much aware and understand the region and the people of the region. The US is only getting aquainted with the region, because only ten years of diplomatic ties is a very short period of time in international relations. However if these countries heavily rely on either Russia or US will also be heavily dependent on them. For example if US chooses to isolate itself from active intervention around the world then Russia will revenge those countries who ignored its interests in the region in the past. It seems that both US and Russia will try to dominate the region, and the countries will always politically manouver between them to make foreign policy best suitable to their interests.

Igor' jan i prosto pishy to shto soobshili po Israel'skomy radio Kol YisraelOccupied Jerusalem: 3 October, 2001 (IAP) -- According to Israel radio (in Hebrew) Kol Yisrael, [shimon] Peres warned [Ariel] Sharon Wednesday that refusing to heed incessant American requests for a cease-fire with the Palestinians would endanger Israeli interests and "turn the US against us." At this point, a furious Sharon reportedly turned toward Peres, saying "every time we do something you tell me Americans will do this and will do that. I want to tell you something very clear, don't worry about American pressure on Israel, we, the Jewish people control America, and the Americans know it."The radio said Peres and other cabinet ministers warned Sharon against saying what he said in public because "it would cause us a public relations disaster."

bolee podrobnie detal'i yje po-tixon'ky vixodiatFBI memo's text tells frustration of Minnesota agents Los Angeles Times Published May 27, 2002WASHINGTON, D.C. -- FBI officials in Washington not only stymied an investigation into flight school student Zacarias Moussaoui before Sept. 11, but they also actively tried to stop field agents from connecting the suspected 20th hijacker to the terrorist attacks even after they occurred, a Minnesota field agent contends in a 13-page "whistle-blower" letter made public Sunday.Minneapolis FBI agent Coleen Rowley's scorching May 21 letter, which caused an uproar last week, was posted, virtually in full, by Time magazine on its Web site Sunday. With the memo's text made public, a fuller picture of Rowley's complaint has emerged.Rowley, general counsel in the Minneapolis field office, also charges in her letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller that intelligence on Moussaoui provided by the French government, which included information on his "activities connected with Osama bin Laden," was more than enough to obtain a special surveillance warrant to search Moussaoui's laptop computer in the weeks before the terrorist attacks.But requests for such a warrant were thwarted.FBI supervisors in Washington seemed so intent on ignoring Moussaoui, Rowley wrote, that some field agents jokingly speculated that officials at FBI headquarters "had to be spies or moles . . . who were actually working for Osama bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis' effort."Last August, FBI agents in Minnesota had become increasingly "desperate" to search the laptop and personal effects of the mysterious Frenchman of Moroccan descent, Rowley wrote. He had been detained on immigration violations after arousing suspicion at an Eagan flight school, where he was trying to learn how to fly an airliner.Moussaoui, 33, has since been indicted as an Al-Qaida operative and is the sole person charged with conspiracy in the Sept. 11 attacks. He faces the death penalty if convicted in a trial scheduled for later this year.Rowley sent her letter to Mueller and several congressional intelligence committee members.FBI officials said Sunday that the letter remains classified and that they would not comment on its contents. But it prompted an immediate and angry reaction on Capitol Hill, from Democrats and Republicans alike. Some said on the Sunday TV talk shows that it was further proof that the FBI needs an overhaul."It is . . . shocking," Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said of Rowley's letter during an appearance on CNN's "Late Edition." "And the only way, I believe, that we're going to get to the bottom of this thing is if we have a broad investigation with a blue-ribbon panel, but also if we release the documents now and hold people accountable."Rep. Porter Goss, R-Fla., said he would use the forthcoming hearings of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, of which he is chairman, to examine whether officials at FBI headquarters had removed information from the Minnesota agents' request for a warrant -- as Rowley contends -- out of concern that they were using "racial profiling."Rowley's detailed, often bitter comments raised a raft of fresh questions Sunday -- particularly her assertion that high-ranking FBI officials had sought to impede an investigation into Moussaoui after the attacks by "a delicate and subtle shading/skewing of facts" concerning mistakes they had made before Sept. 11.Rowley contends the FBI put Americans at further risk by failing to act quickly and aggressively enough to determine whether Moussaoui was part of the Sept. 11 conspiracy or of unrelated and yet-unlaunched terrorist attacks.Within days of Moussaoui's arrest on Aug. 15, FBI field agents in Minneapolis were convinced that he was a dangerous Islamic militant who had sought aviation training for terrorist acts. That belief stemmed from their investigation, as well as a wealth of information provided by the French intelligence service, Rowley said. Her reference to "activities connected to . . . Bin Laden" is the first indication that authorities had suspected Moussaoui of being linked to the alleged terrorist mastermind prior to Sept. 11.Despite those concerns, officials at FBI headquarters in Washington repeatedly quashed efforts to help the field agents secure a special warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which would have allowed them to run wiretaps and search Moussaoui's computer and personal effects, Rowley said.The request for such a warrant was denied Aug. 28. Minutes after two jetliners crashed into the World Trade Center, one of the FBI supervisors in Washington who was intimately involved in the Moussaoui case called Rowley on her cell phone. The "supervisory special agent" told her that "we were to do nothing in Minneapolis until we got [headquarters'] permission because we might 'screw up' something else going on elsewhere in the country," Rowley wrote. She did not name the supervisor."Even after the attacks had begun, [the supervisor] was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence with Minneapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui," she wrote.Rowley criticized FBI officials for promoting the supervisor whom she blames for blowing the Moussaoui investigation.Ultimately, FBI officials did get a warrant to search Moussaoui's computer on Sept. 11, using the same information initially rejected by FBI supervisors as being insufficient in showing probable cause, Rowley said. They found a flight-simulation program, along with information about crop-dusters and other suspicious material.In her letter to Mueller, Rowley asserted her claim to the federal government's "whistle-blower protection" provisions, which prohibits any disciplinary or other retaliatory action while complaints are being investigated.Mueller, who took over the FBI a week before Sept. 11, is moving to greatly increase the intelligence capacity of the bureau by bringing aboard CIA analysts and by forging better ties to the CIA and other intelligence-gathering agencies.

a eto na fotografiax deistvitel'no Mars? oi kak krasivo

y nas SVAD'BA s bol'shoi bykvoi, a y rysskix i prochix prosto povod chtobi byxat', i po-etomy jeniatsa raz 10 chtobi bilo bol'she byxn'i

ia toje tol'ko Cigaron kyriy, kogda privioz v Angliy 4 bloka vse nabrosilis' dai pachky, dai poprobovat' i za nedeliy zakonchilis' oni y menia.