i eshe raz pro azerstan,,,,,,,, ;-) > The Moscow Times > Monday, Sep. 30, 2002. Page 1 > > How Baku Avoided Tbilisi's Troubles > > By Simon Saradzhyan > Staff Writer > Reuters > > Aliyev and Shevardnadze at the groundbreaking of an oil pipeline in Bakuon > Sept. 18. > > Both spent decades climbing the rungs of Soviet bureaucracy. Bothretreated > from public politics after the breakup of the Soviet Union to bide their > time before roaring back to become presidents of sovereign republics. > > But similarities between Haidar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze end here. > > Aliyev, 79, has gradually consolidated his power and now rules Azerbaijan > with a strong hand, enjoying relative economic stability and goodrelations > with all but one of his neighbors. > > In comparison, Shevardnadze, 74, has seen his country's economy spiraldown > and is nowhere close to maintaining a tight grip on the republic whose > biggest neighbor is now threatening to bomb Georgian territory. > > Unlike Shevardnadze, Aliyev saw President Vladimir Putin's ascent to power > in 2000 as an opportunity to build a pragmatic relationship with theKremlin > after years of discord between Moscow and Baku, which some analysts blamed > on an emotionally charged and inconsistent foreign policy pursued byPutin's > predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Aliyev gradually worked to mend relations with > Russia and its new leader, who like him is a product of the KGB. > > Aliyev pleased Moscow by allowing Russian companies to participate in > exploration of Azeri oil and extraditing Chechen rebels. He also made areal > effort to end the crossing of Chechen rebels from Azerbaijan to Russia, to > let Russia keep its early warning radar in Gabala and to no longer bringup > the issue of hosting NATO bases in his public dialogue with Putin. > > In comparison, Shevardnadze continues to push for the closure of Russian > military bases in Georgia and is loudly knocking on NATO's door. At thesame > time, the Georgian leader makes no real effort to round up Chechen rebels > and stalls with the extradition of those rebels who have already been > caught. > > Putin has reciprocated in kind to both Aliyev and Shevardnadze. > > Russia gradually dropped its opposition to the construction of the > Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and sided with Azerbaijan on the delineationof > borders in the oil-rich Caspian Sea after years of supporting analternative > scheme favored by Iran. > > Russia repeatedly cut energy supplies to Georgia, whose capital can nowill > afford street lights, issued Russian passports to residents of Georgia's > separatist provinces and is now threatening to openly bomb Georgian > territory. Russian planes have allegedly bombed the Pankisi Gorge, where > Chechen separatists have chosen to rest and regroup, but Moscow has > staunchly denied any role in the bombings. > > Karine Gevorkyan, a researcher in the Caucasus department of the Oriental > Studies Institute in Moscow, said a defiant Shevardnadze continues topursue > an anti-Russian policy despite threats from the Kremlin, since he believes > the West will one day designate Georgia a deterrent against Russia's > imperialist ambitions in the region. > > Shevardnadze's tough stance generates domestic dividends for him because > many Georgians carry a grudge against Russia for its alleged support of > Abkhazia's violent secessionist bid, among other things, said Gevorkyanand > Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at Norway's International Peace Research > Institute. > > Such a tough stance, though, may prompt Russia not only to start bombing > Georgian territory, but also to cut energy supplies and boost covertsupport > for separatists inside Georgia, edging the republic closer to becoming a > failed state, the experts warned. > > Shevardnadze has no control over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia andSouth > Ossetia, populated by ethnic Abkhazians and Ossetians. Tbilisi has only > limited control over the provinces of Adzharia and Dzhavakhetia, where > ethnic Adzharians and Armenians account for the majority of thepopulation, > as well as over west Georgia, where supporters of Shevardnadze's late foe > and Georgia's first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, enjoy strong support. > "Shevardnadze is running a very great risk," Baev said by phone from Oslo. > > He should at least try to mend fences with Russia by extraditing those > Chechen rebels whom his troops did manage to catch and reinforcing border > guard units along the frontier with Russia to try prevent incursions, said > Alexei Malashenko, senior researcher with the Moscow Carnegie Center. > > These immediate steps would help to prevent airstrikes and defuse the > tensions with Moscow in the short term, he said. Any fundamental > rapprochement would require serious concessions, such as extension of > Russia's military presence in the republic. > > However, Shevardnadze would not be able to make such concessions even ifhe > wanted to, as he has neither the administrative resources nor the popular > support to enforce his will, according to Baev and Gevorkyan. Shevardnadze > has relied on anti-Russian sentiment for so long that any rapprochementwith > Russia would erode the remnants of popular support that he has managed to > preserve, Gevorkyan said. > > And neither is the Kremlin looking for a fundamental rapprochement with > Shevardnadze, who won acclaim in the West but made enemies among theSoviet > top brass during his stint as Soviet foreign minister in the late 1980s. > Instead, the Kremlin is looking beyond Shevardnadze, who is due to leave > office in 2005, hoping that whoever succeeds Shevardnadze will have less > international weight and, thus, will be "easier to deal with," Baev said. > > Russia's foreign-policy makers remain divided on whether the country would > benefit more from normal relations with a stable and economically viable > Georgia or from a weak, if not failed Georgian state, Malashenko said.
