Spezzatura

Езид он грузинскиий, если кому интересно

В смысле товарищ Рейган ? Армян он упомянул мимоходом в речи о жидах и их Холокэше Я не знаю почему дашнаки так завернулись на том чтобы услышать слово "геноцид" из уст амерского преза А менструальные истерики турков по этому поводу, дашнаков как будто только подстегивают. П.С. Кстати, я не помню когда именно - но на определенном этапе speechwriter у Рейгана был Арам Бахшиян.

Доклад героя обороны Гобустана Абиева внуку хамамчи Али.

Kyrgyzstan's Islamist Blowback When he was arrested again two years ago, Ravshan Gapirov was not surprised. A popular defense lawyer for Muslims charged with extremism, Gapirov had long angered authorities in Kyrgyzstan who see Islam as one of the greatest dangers to the country's stability. He spent most of 2008 in prison, accused of supporting a banned pan-Islamist group, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and collaborating with his extremist clients. Gapirov, director of the Justice and Truth Human Rights Advocacy Center in the southern town of Osh, struggles against a confounding system: because of Central Asia's strategic proximity to Afghanistan, the United States and Russia have supported dictatorships that, by banning even peaceful expressions of Islam, have pushed ordinary disaffected Muslims into the arms of radicals, some based in Afghanistan. On April 7, after his security forces fired into a mob, leaving more than eighty dead, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev fled the capital, Bishkek. For the five years of his increasingly corrupt reign, he had attacked Islam as both a security and political threat. But he also hosted a US air base at the Manas airport outside Bishkek, established shortly after 9/11, and thus had an unflinching ally in his campaign, one that was willing to put aside its democratic ideals for a short-term strategic gain. In Bakiyev's sudden and unexpected absence, former opposition leaders from disparate parties announced an interim government and slowly took control. But many of those leaders are tainted with scandal, having previously served with Bakiyev before leaving to form their own personality-driven opposition parties. The acting chair, Roza Otunbayeva, is loved in the West for her grandmotherly demeanor and fluent English, but she is suspected at home of being ineffectual. Other interim ministers are split on where their allegiances lie: with Russia, the former colonial master and driver of Central Asian economies, angry over the presence of American troops in its "near abroad"; or the United States, which most Kyrgyz see as primarily interested in keeping its air base. Washington was quiet as Bakiyev murdered opponents, shut down media outlets, rigged elections and drove even moderate Muslims, afraid they would be targeted as terrorists, to practice their religion in secret. In private conversations, US officials acknowledged Bakiyev's appalling human rights record, but publicly they offered only tepid criticism and continued training his elite military units. Like other Central Asian despots, Bakiyev received lucrative American rewards for highlighting, or even exaggerating, the threat of terrorism. US Ambassador Tatiana Gfoeller underscored this support in October, at the opening of a Kyrgyz special forces complex in Tokmok, where she said, "Brand-new, modern military equipment--trucks, tactical gear, ambulances, night sights, body armor and much more--are arriving in Kyrgyzstan daily and being distributed to Kyrgyzstan's armed forces." Central Asia is a region of varied religious traditions. Islam took root late among the Kyrgyz nomads and fused with local animist and mystic beliefs. But devotion to conservative forms is growing in the Ferghana Valley, a fertile basin of twisting, arbitrary and contested borders and overlapping ethnic groups: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan wrap around one another in puzzle pieces fashioned by Joseph Stalin in the 1920s. The Kyrgyz portion of the valley is home to a large, alienated Uzbek minority. In the 1990s hundreds died in ethnic conflicts. Tensions endure. Judging by the crowded mosques on Fridays and the number of women wearing hijabs on the streets, the valley is more observant than elsewhere in Central Asia. But locals here, like elsewhere, are still more likely to enjoy their vodka than their prayer, or see no problem indulging in both. Nevertheless, Central Asian governments are paranoid, full of atheist apparatchiks trained in the Communist Soviet Union. Only the Islam espoused by a network of state-appointed mullahs is tolerated. From Bakiyev's perspective, "all Muslims are extremists," said Kara-Suu Imam Rashad Kamalov, whose father was gunned down in 2006 in an attack human rights observers attribute to the state security services. Because of the oppression, "more Kyrgyz are devoted to the religion and practice Islam," he told me. But tyranny will not work forever, he added. "After someone has experienced fear once, the fear disappears." Already there is a precedent for radicalism and violence in the Ferghana Valley: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, bent on destroying the corrupt, despotic regime of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. Karimov's fierce crackdown in the 1990s drove the militant group, which grew out of a political movement, to Afghanistan and an alliance with Al Qaeda. IMU members fought alongside militants during the US invasion in 2001. The IMU's core membership is thought to be hiding in the tribal areas of Pakistan, waiting and plotting a return to Central Asia and their traditional base in the Uzbek portion of the Ferghana Valley. Some are probably hiding in Kyrgyzstan. Pointing to the IMU, Bakiyev repeatedly said Kyrgyzstan faces a growing threat from international terror. With insecurity spreading into the previously quiet northern Afghan provinces, attacks throughout the Ferghana Valley have been on the rise, such as an assault in May 2009 on a police station in Khanabad, Uzbekistan, on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz frontier, and an alleged suicide bombing in nearby Andijan the following day. Heightening the fear, the compliant Kyrgyz press eagerly reports the arrest of alleged activists, often those associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a transnational group that seeks to establish a caliphate. While the movement forswears violence and has never been implicated in any violence, it is banned not only in Kyrgyzstan but throughout Central Asia, forcing members to practice underground. Observers such as Osh native Alisher Khamidov, a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins, fear that, hidden from view, Hizb ut-Tahrir could prepare people to join violent groups if it is unable to offer a political solution. There are no accurate figures on membership, but informed estimates say it is 8,000 in Kyrgyzstan alone. "If the state repression of religion continues at this pace and there are not political channels for representing Muslim grievances, we are likely to witness radicalization," Khamidov said, adding, "the Kyrgyz government is definitely exaggerating the threat of radical Islam." The town of Kara-Suu is a natural hub for Hizb ut-Tahrir. Home to one of Central Asia's largest bazaars, it is divided by the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. Crossing it is difficult, even for ethnic Uzbek families separated by the border, and business is hurting. Moreover, little political opposition remains to offer ideological variety. "They mention Hizb ut-Tahrir on television every day," a Hizb ut-Tahrir recruiter told me a few weeks before Bakiyev's overthrow. "One of our tasks is promotion, and this is a natural advertisement for us." He was hiding in the back of a station wagon with tinted windows, sandwiched between stacks of shipping containers in the Kara-Suu bazaar. "Our ideology is spreading, and people are becoming more energetic because Bakiyev has moved away from the principles of democracy. It's a victory for us; we benefit from this." While Hizb ut-Tahrir does not have an anti-Western agenda, he said, Western support for repressive governments in the region is boosting anti-Americanism and providing fertile ground for recruitment. "They say they are building a democratic country, but at the same time they are violating the principles of democracy: freedom of belief, freedom of the press," said a Hizb ut-Tahrir member in Osh in March. "If they find a book they don't like in your house, they take you to jail. What kind of freedom is this?" "We don't have machine guns; we have only ideas," said the Kara-Suu recruiter, explaining the group's methods and comparing Central Asia to czarist Russia in the years before the Bolsheviks seized power. "Who is in prison? Those who have been prosecuted and arrested by the government. And of course these people support us. Many revolutions started in prisons." In October 2008 residents of Nookat organized the Eid al-Fitr festival marking the end of Ramadan, a holiday widely celebrated throughout Kyrgyzstan with the slaughter of sheep--and often a lot of vodka. Villagers say the mayor's office gave permission to celebrate in the town's stadium. Instead, town officials prohibited the celebration and dispersed the crowd. A protest followed in which villagers allegedly threw rocks, breaking windows in a government office. Thirty-two were convicted of inciting unrest and fomenting religious enmity. Sentences ranged up to twenty years. "The authorities interfered in the process of investigation and in the courts. There was no evidence against the convicted. Witnesses were mostly people from law enforcement bodies. It was obvious that they were ordered" to testify, said an Osh-based lawyer who has represented defendants in extremism trials, including the one in Nookat. Several unexplained killings in Uzgen and Jalalabad last summer further rattled Muslim communities and tested the state's credibility. Authorities say they liquidated terrorists infiltrating from Uzbekistan--perpetrators of a suicide bombing by an IMU splinter group in Andijan--yet provided little proof. Human rights activists allege the security services tortured and killed innocent farmers in a botched raid and elaborate cover-up. That several foreign human rights activists investigating the events in Nookat were expelled from Kyrgyzstan in 2009 further undermined faith in the authorities' version of events. Yet while these abuses continued, the United States maintained its support for Bakiyev, calling him a partner in the "war on terror." Earlier this year Washington announced it would build a $5.5 million anti-terrorism training center in the Ferghana Valley. Activists saw a connection between the US aid and Bakiyev's mounting crackdown. "The authorities don't care about their citizens' rights, about absolutely innocent people," said the Nookat defense lawyer, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals. The crackdown is "to show that we have a problem with religious extremism and terrorism, because a lot of money is being allocated for that.... The money is being given to the Kyrgyz government by the United States and by the Russians." Moscow and Washington, both concerned about Islamic terrorism, look the other way while repression continues apace in Central Asia. Moscow is also vying to build an anti-terror training center in the Ferghana Valley, and in this competition for strategic influence, the two are willing to overlook odious behavior. For the United States, that could be a mistake, warns a March report by the conservative Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. It argues that the Central Asian governments' overreaction is promoting radicalization, because "ongoing state-sponsored violence has almost certainly claimed more lives, and surely maimed more fates, than the sporadic actions of a handful of terrorists." The report cautions that US interests in the region, such as the base at Manas and overland transportation networks used to supply American troops in Afghanistan, make tempting targets. Since the violent uprising of April 7, that message has gone unheeded. Washington appears most concerned about keeping the base open, worriedly courting Kyrgyzstan's interim government of bickering former officials and apparatchiks. Many of these figures led the so-called Tulip Revolution of 2005. Now they are struggling to define their legitimacy. Some are angry with the United States for not speaking out against Bakiyev's human rights abuses and have openly said Manas must be closed. It's too early to tell how they will approach human rights, but already power struggles are apparent, and friends have told me they fear the recent upheaval just delivered more of the same, as the new leaders are all recycled from past governments. Bloodshed is on many people's minds these days--not just the kind Bakiyev left on the streets of Bishkek as he fled. "The authorities don't know what they want to achieve. But in my opinion, it will lead to a very bloody revolution if it goes on like this. I am convinced that such a revolution is inevitable," Gapirov, the human rights lawyer, told me a few weeks before Bakiyev's downfall. When it comes to human rights and Islam, in a country known for its spontaneous uprisings, the new government and its foreign backers would be wise to listen. _http://www.thenation.com/doc/20100510/trilling/2_

Педро надо было дать по ипалу ещё на улице при первой попытке напрячь воздух. Это бы предотвратило его появление на пороге дома с дальнейшим "ожесточенным стучанием ногой по двери". И повлекшим за этим пуганием домашних. По любому, сага закончилась бы общением с мусорами. Но зато статья бы была помягче : assault and battery

A Russian-Uzbek challenge to the US Reports have appeared in the Russian media doubting the pedigree of the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Moscow seems to be edging away from the interim administration head, Roza Otunbayeva, a former Kyrgyz ambassador to London and Washington. The reports hint at covert United States backing for the uprising in Bishkek. They claim a drug mafia incited the latest regime change in Bishkek with covert US support - "the geostrategic interests of the US and the international narco-mafia happily merged ... It was only logical to use the services of narco-barons to overthrow [former president Kurmanbek] Bakiyev, who demanded from the US more and more payments for his loyalty". A Russian commentator told Ekho Moscow radio, "The revolution n Kyrgyzstan was organized by the drug business." Kyrgyzstan is a hub of drug trafficking. The acreage of poppy cultivation in Kyrgyzstan has exponentially increased and is comparable today to Afghanistan. There have been reports in the Russian (and Chinese) press linking the US base in Manas with drug barons. Iranian intelligence captured the Jundallah terrorist leader, Abdulmalik Rigi, when he was traveling in a Kyrgyz aircraft en route to an alleged rendezvous in Manas. The Russian media leaks enjoy some degree of official blessing. They highlight circumstantial evidence questioning the nature of the revolt in Bishkek. Meanwhile, the influential think-tank Stratfor has rushed the interpretation alleging a Russian hand. Between these claims and counter-claims, Moscow seems to be veering to the assessment that Washington has benefited from Otunbayeva's political consolidation in Bishkek. As a Russian commentator put it, "There are further indications that Moscow is cautious about the new Kyrgyz administration ... The truth is that there are no 100% pro-Russian politicians in Kyrgyzstan's interim government ... and quite a few of them are definitely associated with the West." Indeed, Otunbayeva told the Washington Post and Newsweek that the US lease on the Manas air base would be extended "automatically" and that "we will continue with such long-term relations" with the US. US Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia Robert Blake said in Bishkek after two days of consultations with Otunbayeva that her leadership offered "a unique and historic opportunity to create a democracy that could be a model for Central Asia and the wide region". Blake hailed the regime change in Bishkek as a "democratic transition" and promised US aid to "find quick ways to improve the economic and social situation". The sporadic attacks on ethnic Russians in Kyrgyzstan (estimated to number 700,000) have also set alarm bells ringing in Moscow. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev ordered the military to take necessary measures. A Kremlin spokesman said these would include increased security for "Russian interests" in Kyrgyzstan. Moscow seems unsure whether the attacks on the Russians are isolated incidents. An overall slide toward anarchy is palpable with armed gangs taking the law into their hands and the clans in southern Kyrgyzstan rooting for Bakiyev's reinstatement. At any rate, Medvedev manifestly changed tack on Tuesday after talks with visiting Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov. He clearly distanced Russia from identifying with Otunbayeva's interim government. Medvedev said: Essentially, we need to revive the state, the state does not exist at this time, it has been deposed. We are hoping that the interim administration will make all the necessary measures to achieve that, as anarchy will have a negative effect on the interests of the Kyrgyz people and also their neighbors. Legitimization of the authorities is extremely important, which means there need to be elections, not a de facto fulfillment of powers. Only in this case can [Russia's] economic cooperation be developed. Russia has extended humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan, but full-fledged economic cooperation will be possible only after the proper institutions of power have been created. Uzbekistan's president shares this view. The joint Russian-Uzbek stance challenged the interim government not to regard itself as a legally constituted administration, no matter Washington's robust backing for it. Clearly, Moscow and Tashkent are pushing Otunbayeva to not make any major policy decisions (such as over the US Manas base). She should instead focus on ordering fresh elections that form a newly elected government. Otunbayeva had indicated her preference for far-reaching constitutional reforms to be worked out first that would transform Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary democracy from the current presidential system of government. Moscow sees this as a ploy by the interim government to postpone elections and cling onto power with US backing. Meanwhile, Bakiyev, who fled to Kazakhstan last weekend, has since shifted to Belarus. It is unclear whether Minsk acted on its own to give asylum to Bakiyev. Soon after reaching Minsk, Bakiyev announced that he hadn't yet resigned from office. "There is no power which will make me resign from the presidential post. Kyrgyzstan will not be anyone's colony," he said. Bakiyev called on world leaders not to recognize Otunbayeva's government. Bakiyev's stance puts Washington in a bind. The US got along splendidly with Bakiyev and it is getting into stride equally splendidly with Otunbayeva. But it has no means of persuading Bakiyev to agree to a lawful, orderly transition of power to Otunbayeva. Nor can Washington politically underwrite Otunbayeva's government if its legitimacy is doubted in the region (and within Kyrgyzstan itself). Besides, Otunbayeva is not acquitting herself well in stemming the country's slide toward clan struggle, fragmentation and anarchy. During his two-day visit to Moscow, Karimov made it clear that Tashkent took a dim view of the regime change in Bishkek. Using strong language, Karimov said, "There is a serious danger that what's happening in Kyrgyzstan will take on a permanent character. The illusion is created that it's easy to overthrow any lawfully elected government." He warned that instability in Kyrgyzstan may "infect" other Central Asian states. Russia and Uzbekistan have found it expedient to join hands. Medvedev stressed that his talks with Karimov in Moscow were "trusting and engaging with regard to all aspects of our bilateral relations, international and regional affairs". Karimov reciprocated, "Uzbekistan sees Russia as a reliable, trusted partner, which shows that Russia plays a critical role in ensuring peace and stability throughout the world, but in Central Asia in particular." "Our viewpoints coincided completely," Karimov asserted. He added, "What is going on today in Kyrgyzstan is in nobody's interests - and above all, it is not in the interests of countries bordering Kyrgyzstan." Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also underscored the regional alignment. "Uzbekistan is the key country in Central Asia. We have special relations with Uzbekistan," he said. Conceivably, Russia and Uzbekistan will now expect the Kyrgyz developments to be brought onto the agenda of the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is scheduled to take place in Tashkent in June. A semi-official Russian commentary said, "The summit may help to work out mechanisms to ensure security in the country and in the whole region." The SCO secretary general (who is based in Beijing) visited Bishkek last week and met Otunbayeva. Washington faces a potential diplomatic headache here. It needs to ensure the forthcoming SCO summit doesn't becomes a replay of the 2005 summit, which questioned the raison d'etre of the American military presence in Central Asia. If Washington forces the pace of the great game, a backlash may ensue, which could snowball into calls for the eviction of the US from the Manas base, as some influential sections of Kyrgyz opinion are already demanding. If that were to happen, the big question would be whether Otunbayeva would be able to get the American chestnuts out of the fire. Hailing from the southern city of Osh but having lived her adult life in the capital, which is dominated by northern clans, she lacks a social or political base and is at a disadvantage. The geopolitical reality is that Kyrgyzstan has to harmonize with the interests of the regional powers - Russia and Uzbekistan in particular - as should the US, in the larger interests of regional stability. The fact remains that Russian and Uzbek (and Kazakh) influence within Kyrgyz society and politics remains preponderant. And China too has legitimate interests. The Kremlin will not fall into the same bear trap twice. In Georgia under somewhat similar circumstances the US took generous help from Russia in the stormy winter of 2003 to clear the debris of the "Rose" revolution and "stabilize" the ground situation before promptly installing Mikheil Saakashvili, who has been a thorn in the flesh for Moscow ever since. _http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LD23Ag02.html_

Барух Хусейнович является всего лишь главой исполнительной власти американского властного трезубца. Для того чтобы нести юридическую нагрузку, характеризовать те или иные событие как "геноцид" входит в компетенцию законадательно органа. Президент Ширак не признавал армянский геноцид. Это сделал высший законадательный орган Франции. Беня Эльцин не признавал армянский геноцид. Это сделал высший законадательный орган России. Лично от себя, Барух Хусейнович признал армянский геноцид не вчера - и даже не позавчера. Что он, кстати, подчеркивал 500 раз. Неужели такие "сложные" нюансы требуют от человека наличие степени от Harvard Law School ?

Внук хамамчи Али будучи человеком который провел войну в стенах турецкого казино, смотрит на восток в сторону Каспия думая что Карабах это где-то там.

Мне всегда было интересно кто это ач у дзах приглашает в Армению пропагандиста Томаса Дюваля. То есть, кто ещё помимо регион-интегрирующего Георгия Ваняна и Ко. Ду ми аса, Осканян

On the Armenian Government’s Decision to Freeze the Current Armenia-Turkey Process It was clear from the beginning that a prolonged presentation of the desirable as real is not sustainable, and that the government would have to finally acknowledge reality. I am astonished by two things, however. First, the government is openly acknowledging that for one whole year they watched as Turkey placed preconditions before them, Turkey exploited the process for its own benefit, and they not only tolerated this, but continuously insisted that this is not happening and that this whole process is a big success and an unprecedented diplomatic victory. Second, if there were half a dozen possible exit strategies from this situation – from doing nothing to revoking Armenia’s signature – the government has chosen the option least beneficial to us. Turkey no longer has an obligation to open the border before the Karabakh conflict is resolved which is what Turkey had wanted all along. The Armenian side did that which is most desirable for Turkey: neither ratified the protocols nor revoked them thus giving Turkey the opportunity to continue to remain actively engaged in the Karabakh process. For a whole year, the authorities rejected the problems in the Armenia-Turkey process and responded to all criticism by insisting that all is well. Today, in fact, we see that they did understand that things were not proceeding as desired, yet they prolonged the process for more than a year, hoping that it would be possible to avoid accepting the truthfulness of the criticism. Today, I want to invite attention to the fact that the same problems are inherent in the Karabakh process. In response to my criticism, they continue to insist that all is well, and there are no dangerous developments. But this is no time to gloat. Nor is this about stubbornly insisting on the absolute truthfulness of one’s own position. The facts cannot be ignored. The negotiations are proceeding unfavorably. The situation must be corrected, even if that requires making clear policy changes. The government must boldly assess the situation, and acknowledge its seriousness so that we will not find ourselves in the same situation regarding Karabakh. But for that, there first must be acknowledgement and acceptance that there are in fact problems, there must be an attempt to identify their root causes, and no longer resort to the tradition of negating reality. I am also worried about another trend. For two years, various government representatives applauded the Armenia-Turkey process and ignored all the problems. They raised public expectations about a speedy normalization of relations and opening of the border. And when none of that happened for reasons that were obvious from the beginning, there is an opposite and equally extreme reaction. The same public relations machine is subsumed by anti-Turkish propaganda. Various government representatives have adopted extremist stereotypical positions. Incautious policies all-around have brought us to a dead-end in Armenia-Turkey relations and this new tendency can further deteriorate an already-delicate situation, and render impossible necessary future positive developments. _http://www.civilitasfoundation.org/cf/component/content/article/87-perspective/411-on-the-armenian-governments-decision-to-freeze-the-current-armenia-turkey-process-.html_

Духовное управление мусульман Кавказа это гэбешная контора со времен Совдепии когда теологические нюансы игнорировалась. Основная масса магометан Кавказа принадлежит к сюнитской ветке. Шейх-уль-ислам Аллахшукюр Паша-заде это гэбешная подстава, да к тому же шиитского разлива. Засим для сюнитов он не авторитет по дефолту. Елдаш Паша-заде есть протеже сына хамамчи Али ещё со времен первого срока его царствования на просторах Апшеронистана.

САС = командир части Т.Саргсян = зампотех и зампотыл в одном флаконе Гарегин II = замполит ?

Պուրճ Համուտ Falafel Arak

ASALA ? В Бурдж Хамудском фалафеланоце кто-то с араком явно переборщил.

Азербайджанский школьник Гейдар Алиев купил 9 особняков в Дубае В начале прошлого года в течение двух недель 11-летний мальчик из Азербайджана стал собственником сразу 9 особняков в Дубае. Об этом пишет газета The Washington Post. Особняки общей стоимостью 44 миллиона долларов расположены в прибрежной зоне искусственного острова Палм-Джумейра (Palm Jumeirah), недвижимость на котором, в основном, покупают мультимиллионеры. Со ссылкой на информацию департамента земельных ресурсов эмирата газета пишет, что юного владельца элитных особняков зовут Гейдар Алиев. Так же зовут сына нынешнего президента Азербайджана Ильхама Алиева. Более того, отмечает The Washington Post, дата рождения мальчика, указанная в документах на дома, совпадает с датой рождения сына азербайджанского президента. В пресс-службе Ильхама Алиева газете отказались комментировать ситуацию с покупкой сыном президента или его полным тезкой и ровесником дорогостоящего жилья в Дубае. Издание пишет, что в реестре недвижимости эмирата также зарегистрирована жилая недвижимость на имена Лейлы Алиевой и Арзу Алиевой. У президента Алиева есть две дочери с теми же именами и примерно того же возраста, отмечает газета. Таким образом, заключает The Washington Post, трое граждан Азербайджана с теми же именами и фамилиями, что и у детей Ильхама Алиева, владеют в Дубае недвижимостью общей стоимостью около 75 миллионов долларов. Ильхам Алиев стал президентом Азербайджана в ноябре 2003 года, сменив на этом посту своего отца Гейдара Алиева. В октябре 2008 года Ильхам Алиев повторно был избран главой государства (за него проголосовали более 88 процентов граждан республики). В 1983 году он женился на Мехрибан Алиевой. Имеет троих детей: дочерей Арзу и Лейлу и сына Гейдара. _http://realty.lenta.ru/news/2010/03/05/boy/_

В свое время султан Абдул-Меджид нанял армян чтобы спроектировали и построили ему новый Dolmabahçe Sarayı. Ну они ему его и отгрохали. И где сейчас потомки этих армян ?

Конечно поминание 24 Апреля в Стамбуле не обошлось без традиционной Турецкой Толерантности™ А этот елдаш хочет чтобы не забывали о турецких дипломатах которых рэхмят элясин благодаря ASALA

Второй год в контексте президенства Баруха на которого возлагались прибольшущие надежды потому что он не профессиональный политик в отличие от предшествовавших ему проституток. Кстати разочарованы не только хаи, но и афро-амеры. А жиды так вообще бьются головой апстенку.

Ceremony in Istanbul's Taksim Square honors Armenian deaths _http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=200-gather-in-istanbuls-taksim-square-to-commemorate-armenian-deaths-2010-04-24_

Правозащитники проводят акции протеста в Стамбуле Сатеник Ванцян, Стамбул В связи с 95-й годовщиной Геноцида армян в субботу курдские и турецкие правозащитники провели две акции протеста в Стамбуле. Сначала в центре Стамбула, близ площади Таксим, собрались курдские и турецкие правозащитники. Здесь еженедельно проводят акцию протеста курдские матери, требующие вернуть им их пропавших детей. Сегодня по случаю 95-й годовщины Геноцида армян курдские матери вместе с фотографиями своих детей держали также портреты представителей армянской интеллигенции. «Мы готовы говорить о Геноциде армян до тех пор, пока в Турции его наконец не признают», - в беседе с Радио Свобода заявила правозащитница Озлем Далкиран. В нескольких метрах от места проведения акции правозащитников собралась другая группа турецких демонстрантов, которые развернули плакаты и выкрикивали, что армяне убивали турок. Более крупную акцию протеста правозащитники провели на железнодорожном вокзале Хайдарпаша, откуда в 1915 году была выслана первая группа представителей армянской интеллигенции. В прозвучавших здесь речах участники акции, насчитывавшей около ста человек, отмечали, что нельзя допустить повторения подобных событий. Территория была окружена большим числом полицейских. Правозащитники держали в руках портреты представителей армянской интеллигенции. К собравшимся обратилась правозащитница Эрен Кескин: «События, имевшие место в 1915 году, не должны повториться. Сегодня мы собрались здесь и говорим «нет» геноциду!» Под конец акции один пожилой турок попытался помешать ее проведению, выкрикнув: «Кто разрешил им здесь собраться? Кто сказал, что армян убивали? Ничего подобного не было!» Инцидент был улажен после вмешательства полиции, мужчина был уведен с места проведения акции. Вечером ожидается проведение еще одного, более крупного мероприятия на площади Таксим, инициаторами которого являются известные представители турецкой интеллигенции. _http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/2023374.html_

@ Kars Дашнаки (амерские) не ожидали быть разочарованными второй год подряд. Вроде бы.

Как я и предсказывал, Барух вместо слова "геноцид" использовал "Meds Yeghern".

Открывший стрельбу по прохожим мужчина оказался милиционером Мужчина в форме, открывший вечером в субботу стрельбу по прохожим на востоке Москвы, является сотрудником 6 отдела вневедомственной охраны УВД Восточного административного округа. Об этом сообщает агентство "Интерфакс" со ссылкой на неназванный источник в правоохранительных органах. По словам собеседника агентства, старший сержант милиции Константин Ратников, находясь в состоянии крайнего алкогольного опьянения, повздорил с тремя подростками, а затем начал по ним стрелять из травматического пистолета. Раненых не оказалось, так как милиционер в подростков не попал. Инцидент произошел во дворе дома 14 по Саперному проезду. Очевидцы вызвали на место происшествия наряд милиции, который задержал пьяного милиционера и доставил его в ОВД "Ивановское". Представители УВД ВАО и представители прокуратуры устанавливают обстоятельства дела. Ранее РИА Новости передавало, что стрельбу по прохожим открыл мужчина в форме сотрудника ЧОПа. Между тем в ГУВД Москвы "Интерфаксу" сообщили, что Ратников стрелял из травматического пистолета не в подростков, а в сторону. По официальной версии ГУВД, старший сержант сделал замечание подросткам, которые распивали спиртные напитки в общественном месте. Молодые люди ответили милиционеру нецензурно, и Ратников выстрелил из травматического пистолета в сторону. Информацию об алкогольном опьянении мужчины в ГУВД не опровергли, но и не подтвердили. _http://www.lenta.ru/news/2010/04/24/brawl/_

Eight Months Later, a U.S. Ambassador to Baku Since July, when Anne Derse migrated from Baku to Vilnius, there has been no American ambassador to Azerbaijan, which not very long ago was regarded as one of Washington's most important allies. Don Lu, a very capable diplomat whom I met years ago when he was based in Pakistan, stepped in as charge d'affaires. Yet that Lu wasn't ambassadorial rank has rubbed the Azeris the wrong way. The impression in the senior ranks of the Baku government is that Washington simply doesn't rate the country very high. One sign of the strain showed just a couple of days ago, when Azerbaijan announced that it was canceling military exercises planned next month with the U.S. Azerbaijan is miffed that Washington is pushing Armenia and Turkey to open their joint border, but has failed to include as part of the deal a settlement of the long Azeri-Armenia dispute over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. The two republics went to war over the enclave for some five years in the late 1980s and early 1990s. If a U.S. ambassador had been in Baku, he or she might have smoothed over this tension with Baku. It hasn't been a matter of neglect. In fact, the Bush-era State Department had sent the name of a diplomat with long experience in the region -- Matthew Bryza, a skilled player of pipeline politics whom I've known for some 13 years -- to the White House as its choice for the Azeri post. But the White House didn't send Bryza's nomination to the Senate, and neither has the Obama Administration. Until now. I've received confirmation that -- after the clearing of a couple of remaining administrative hurdles -- the White House will officially nominate Bryza as U.S. ambassador. He will then be scheduled for a nomination hearing in the Senate. The hearings should be lively. For starters, Bryza himself has been something of a lightning rod of attention. This blog has written about his time as deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. Over recent years, I received fairly frequent emails griping about this or that impolitic (read: anti-Russian) speech that Bryza delivered on his journeys, and his inexhaustible supply of rationales for building the ill-fated Nabucco natural gas pipeline. Bryza seemed to rub the Foggy Bottom crowd the wrong way when he made no secret of his desire for the Azeri post, and when it seemed he might get it since he was a favorite of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. Getting past these intramurals, the 2008 Georgian-Russian war is likely to be a key subject of the confirmation hearings. Bryza was extremely close to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, and Bryza's critics assert that he helped to mislead Saakashvili into thinking he could expect U.S. military assistance should he run into trouble while he attacked South Ossetia in August 2008. As we know, no such assistance arrived as a considerable swath of Georgian territory was overrun by the Russian military. The fiasco was an enormous blow to U.S. prestige, because it led governments throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia to understand that, contrary to what at least some of them believed, they couldn't expect U.S. help in a confrontation with Russia. In his own defense, Bryza will deny that he led Saakashvili to any such conclusion. It was the opposite -- Bryza will point to numerous occasions in which he told Saakashvili not to use force in his conflict with South Ossetia. In the end, Bryza has been watching and working on the region's most important topics for more than a decade from the inside. He can hit the ground running, the first order of business being smoothing over the tension over the Turkey-Armenia accord, which itself appears to be in trouble. The likelihood seems that all the topics will be aired, and Bryza will be confirmed. _http://www.oilandglory.com/_